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The California Supreme Court Survey
A Review of Decisions:
March 1981 - May 1981

In a continuing effort to provide the legal community with an analytical
examination of recent California Supreme Court cases, the Pepperdine
Law Review surveys the following decisions as indicative of current court
activity. The following is designated to briefly expose the practitionerto
recent decisions which are anticipated to significantly impact California
law.
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I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A.

CRnINAL DUE PROCESS

1. The Right to Effective Counsel: People v.
Barboza
Conflicts of interest arise in a number of situationswhen counsel undertakes to represent multiple defendants. The California Supreme Court in
People v. Barboza examines a situation wherein a contract between the
county and the public defender's office resulted in a disincentivefor counsel to search out possible conflicts. The court concludes that these contracts
in themselves present inherent and irreconcilablecontflicts of interest.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the situation where counsel undertakes the representation of
multiple defendants, various circumstances often promote the
existence of irreconcilable conflicts of interest. One such set of
circumstances is found in the California Supreme Court case of
People v. Barboza.1
The conflict of interest in Barboza involved the legal affect of a
contract between the County of Madera and the Madera County
Public Defender's office. The agreement, in relevant part, provided for the payment of $104,000 per year by the County to the
Public Defender's office. From this amount, $15,000 was to be deducted and deposited in a reserve account for the purpose of retaining alternative defense counsel in the event the Public
Defender was disqualified due to a conflict of interest. At the end
of each fiscal year, the residue balance of the reserve account, if
any, was to be paid to the Public Defender; conversely, the Defender was liable for any deficit in the account. 2 The natural consequence of this provision was that fewer outside attorneys
employed by the County, more money that became available to
the Public Defender.
The case arose out of the arrests and convictions of two brothers on charges of assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to
1. 29 Cal. 3d 375, 627 P.2d 188, 173 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981). The majority opinion

was written by Justice Richardson with Justices Tobriner, Mosk, Newman, Grodin,
and Reynoso concurring. Justices Grodin and Reynoso were assigned by the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council. Chief Justice Bird wrote the concurring
opinion.

/

2. Id. at 378, 627 P.2d at 189, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 459. The balance of the compensation to the Public Defender was paid in monthly installments of $7416.66.
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produce great bodily injury.3 Both brothers were jointly represented by an attorney provided by the Public Defender of Madera
County. 4 The defendants appealed their convictions, asserting
5
the deprivation of effective counsel as their primary contention,
with the thrust of their argument centering upon the financial disincentive for the Public Defender to investigate and curtail any
conflicts of interest. This disincentive, it was argued, was the direct consequence of the agreement between the County and the
Public Defender's office. 6

11.

THE SUPREME CouRT's ANALYsIs

In finding an irreconcilable conflict of interest and requiring a
retrial with separate counsel for the defendants, the California
Supreme Court first recognized the fundamental premise that
joint representation of multiple defendants by either appointed or
retained counsel is not impermissible. 7 In such situations, the
court explained that the ethical obligations imposed upon counsel
and the informed choice of defendants themselves as to whether
to accept joint representation have generally assured conflictfree representation. 8 It was held, however, that in cases such as
Barboza where contractual arrangements act as a disincentive to
defense counsel to declare a conflict of interest, such ethical con3. Conflicting evidence at trial related to a physical attack on the victim
outside a Madera bar. 29 Cal. 3d at 378, 627 P.2d at 189, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
4. Although the record did not reflect the formal appointment of counsel, defendants were jointly represented by an attorney from the Madera Public Defender's office. The defendants were thereupon arraigned and plead not guilty to
the charge. 29 Cal. 3d at 377-378, 627 P.2d at 189, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ... and to have the assistance of Counsel for his defense." CAL. CONST. art 1, § 13 states that "In criminal
prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right to...
appear and defend in person and with counsel."
6. The essence of this assertion is that due to the loss of revenue that will be
realized by the public defender, he will not be as zealous in the search for possible
conflicts as would be the case without this economic disincentive. Therefore, due
to the conflict of interest, the defendants were deprived of effective assistance of
counsel. 29 Cal. 3d at 378, 627 P.2d at 189, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
7. 29 Cal. 3d at 378, 627 P.2d at 189, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 459. Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (the sixth amendment is not violated unless multiple representation gives rise to a conflict of interest); People v. Cook, 13 CaL 3d 663, 671, 532
P.2d 148, 153, 119 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505 (1975), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 870 (1975) (if counsel is privately retained, the court does not assume the burden of assuring that
effective counsel is assured.
8. 29 Cal. 3d at 378, 627 P.2d at 189, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 459.

siderations cannot properly be relied upon to insure proper client
representation. 9 The typical conflict situation involving joint representation was also distinguished from the instant case by the
fact that here, unlike the former setting, the initial conflict is created at the moment of counsel's appointment. The opposing interests of adequate legal representation versus the protection of
one's own financial resources immediately confronts the public
defender.10 It was noted further that in the case of appointed
counsel to an indigent defendant, there may exist a general ignorance on the part of the client regarding possible financial selfinterests of the attorney. This, coupled with the indigent defendant's financial inability to seek separate representation, distinguishes this situation from that in which multiple defendants
jointly retain single counsel."
Although the court refrained from any suggestion that the Public Defender in Barboza knowingly concealed the possibility of
conflicts arising from joint representation of the defendants, it did
stress the overriding interest in preventing counsel from being
placed in a situation where conflicting concerns could affect representation of clients. The requirement that "the public have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system
of criminal justice" was also noted as a compelling force influencing the court's decision.12 Applying these principles to the facts
of the present case, the court opined that the competing interests
presented by the appointment of counsel to the defendants in
question resulted in not only "an appearance of impropriety" but
the creation of "a real and insoluble tension ... between [the defendants' rights and] the defender's conflicting interests.13
The court also found significant the case of Marshall v. Jerrico,
9. 29 Cal. 3d at 379, 627 P.2d at 189, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 459. Pursuant to the contract, the fewer outside attorneys that were engaged, the more money was available for the operation of the Public Defender's office. The direct consequence of
this arrangement was a financial disincentive for the Public Defender to either investigate or declare the existence of actual or potential conflict of interest requiring the employment of other counsel.
10. 29 Cal. 3d at 379, 627 P.2d at 189, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 459. See also Jague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 GEO. L.J. 1075,

1077-78 (1979), which states that a "conflict could surface at any stage of the proceedings--plea bargaining, investigation and preparation of a defense, the decision
whether to have the defendants testify, the final argument, or allocation at
sentencing."
11. 29 Cal. 3d at 379, 627 P.2d at 189-190, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 459-460.
12. 29 Cal. 3d at 379-80, 627 P.2d at 190, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 469; People v. Rhodes,
12 Cal. 3d 180, 186-187, 524 P.2d 363, 367-368, 115 Cal. Rptr. 235, 239-240 (1974) (held
that a city attorney who had prosecutorial responsibilities and yet was representing an indigent criminal defendant had the appearance of impropriety).
13. 29 Cal. 3d at 381, 627 P.2d at 191, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
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Inc.14 which held that violation determinations and assessment
of fines by an assistant regional administrator of the Department
of Labor were not improper despite the fact that such penalties
were paid to the Employment Standards Administration within
the same department. The Barboza court distinguished Marshall
on the ground that no government official actually profited from
the assessed fines in that case,15 whereas here the Public Defender's income and office budget were directly affected by his determination of whether an actual conflict of interest situation
existed.16 As a consequence of the obvious affect upon lawyer-client relationships resulting from the agreement involved, the court
concluded that "as a 'judicially declared rule of criminal procedure,'... contracts of the type herein presented contain inherent
and irreconcilable conflicts of interest."17

III.

CONCLUSION

It appears that the main impact of People v. Barboza on the legal community is simply its illustrative value insofar as providing
yet another setting in which conflicts of interest resulting from
joint representation of multiple defendants may arise. It suggests
a legal guide to the drafting of employment contracts in the realm
of the public defender's office to the effect that such contracts
may not now create situations in which the private interests of
the appointed attorneys will be affected by their decisions with
respect to client representation.
B.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1. A ClarificationRegarding the Test for Lesser Included Offenses: People v. Lohbauer
Two tests have traditionally been used to determine whether the crime
convicted of is a lesser included offense within the crime charged. A third
test was being developed in the appellate courts allowing defendants to be.
convicted of an offense other than the one chargedunless they were misled
to their prejudice and preventedfrom preparing an effective defense. The
California Supreme Court in People v. Lohbauer rejected this third test,
14. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
15. 29 Cal. 3d at 380, 627 P.2d at 190, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 460. The court said "[i]t is
plain that no official's salary is affected by the levels of the penalties." Id.
16. See note 9 supra.
17. 29 Cal. 3d at 381, 627 P.2d at 191, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 461.

holding that its adoption would violate the well settled statutory interpretation of "necessarily included."

I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Lohbauer,1 the California Supreme Court rejected
an additional test for lesser included offenses 2 that had developed
in the appellate courts.3 The appellate courts had been using this
additional test in determining whether the offense for which a defendant is convicted could be considered a lesser included offense
within the crime charged. This new test allowed the appellate
courts to uphold the convicted offense unless the defendant was
misled to his prejudice and prevented from preparing an effective
defense. The test had developed as a result of the appellate
court's interpretation of language in the California Supreme
4
Court decision of People v. Collins.
II. FACTS
In Lohbauer, the defendant was charged by information with
burglary. 5 The complainant testified that on the night in question
she awakened to see the defendant standing in the hallway
outside her bedroom. When she asked him what he wanted, the
defendant walked out of the house. The defendant testified that
he was intoxicated and mistakenly believed he was in the home
of a woman friend who had invited him to stop by. He alleged
that upon seeing the complainant, he realized his mistake and
left.
A requisite element of the charge of burglary is entering with
1. 29 Cal. 3d 364, 627 P.2d 183, 173 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1981). The majority opinion
was written by Justice Richardson with Justices Tobriner, Mosk, Newman, Rattigan and Reynoso concurring. A separate concurring opinion was written by Chief
Justice Bird. Justices Rattigan and Reynoso were assigned by the Chairperson of
the Judicial Council.
2. Statutory authority for lesser included offenses is found in the California
Penal Code, which authorizes a trier of fact to "find the defendant guilty of any
offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is
charged, or of an attempt to commit the offense." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1159 (West
1970).
3. Most of the cases arose from the Court of Appeal, Second District, Divisions 1 and 2.
4. 54 Cal. 2d 57, 351 P.2d 326, 4 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1960) (Defendants convicted of
statutory rape as a lesser included offense of rape by force or violence). See text
following note 10 infra.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West Supp. 1981). The pertinent text reads:
"Every person who enters any house, room, apartment,. . . with intent to commit
grand or petty larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. As used in this * * *
chapter, 'inhabited' means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether
occupied or not." Id.
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intent to commit larceny or any felony. 6 In a non-jury trial, the
court found reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant harbored the requisite intent upon entering the complainant's residence. The court, therefore, found the defendant not guilty.
However, the court did find the defendant guilty of the misdemeanor offense of entering a noncommercial dwelling without the
consent of the owner. 7 The trial court believed this charge to be a
lesser and necessarily included offense within the crime of
burglary.
The supreme court examined the established principles with respect to the test for lesser included offenses. The court confronted the People's argument that a new test had been
developed in which variances between the offenses charged and a
lesser offense of which the defendant is convicted would be immaterial, unless the defendant was misled to his prejudice and
prevented from preparing an effective defense. The supreme
court disapproved of those cases adopting this construction of its
decision in Collins. The court held fast to the established due
process principles that one must have notice and opportunity to
prepare and present a defense so as not to be surprised by evidence offered at trial.

III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The fundamental principles underlying lesser included offenses
are found in the fourteenth amendment 8 and in the California
Constitution's requirements of procedural due process. 9 Due process would require that the accused be advised of the charges
against him in order to avoid unfair surprise, allowing him to prepare and present a defense to all possible offenses.1 0 Under the
6. Id.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 602.5 (West 1970). The text reads as follows:

Every person other than a public officer or employee acting within the
course and scope of his employment in performance of a duty imposed by
law, who enters or remains in any noncommercial dwelling house, apartment, or other such place without consent of the owner, his agent, or the
person in lawful possession thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
8. The U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 1 provides: "[nior shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
9. The relevant provision of the California Constitution reads: "nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." CAL. CONST. art. 1,

§ 13.

10. "Due process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges

theory of lesser included offenses, a defendant can be convicted
of a crime not charged; therefore, any test must include a determination of whether the requisite notice has been met.
There are two well established tests used to determine lesser
included offenses. First, where an offense cannot be committed
without committing another offense, the latter is a lesser included
offense." The second test is whether the offense has been specifically charged in the information. This is the "accusatory pleading" test and is satisfied "if the facts alleged in the charging
papers sufficiently notified defendant of any potential lesser in...12 The problem the court faced in Lohbauer
cluded offenses.
was whether it should adopt a third test being used by the appellate courts.
The third test has its origin in the supreme court case of People
v. Collins.'3 That case involved three defendants accused of rape
by force or violence.' 4 In a non-jury trial, the defendants were
found guilty of rape by intercourse with a female under the age of
against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and
present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial."
People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 612, 477 P.2d 409, 419, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 395 (1970).
West involved a defendant who was charged with possession of marijuana. After
his motion to suppress was denied, the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the
lesser offense of opening or maintaining a place to sell, give away or use a narcotic
(CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11557) (repealed 1972). One of the issues was
whether the trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction in accepting the plea to a
lesser offense when the lesser offense was not an included offense. The court held
that since the defendant requested or acquiesced in the conviction of the lesser
offense, he could not legitimately claim lack of notice. The court, therefore, had
jurisdiction to convict him of that offense.
11. People v. Cole, 94 Cal. App. 3d 854, 861, 155 Cal. Rptr. 892, 895 (1979) (Defendant convicted of assault with a deadly weapon as a lesser included offense
within the charged assault with intent to commit murder). See text accompanying
notes 18-20 infra.
12. People v. Muis, 102 Cal. App. 3d 206, 209, 163 Cal. Rptr. 791, 793 (1980) (Defendant convicted of unauthorized entry as a lesser included offense within the
charge of burglary). See text accompanying notes 24-27 infra.
13. See note 4 supra.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (repealed 1970) read:
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female not the
wife of the perpetrator, under either of the following circumstances:
1. Where the female is under the age of eighteen years; 2. Where she is
incapable, through lunacy or other unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent; 3. Where she resists, but her
resistance is overcome by force or violence; 4 Where she is prevented
from resisting by threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution, or by an intoxicating narcotic, or anaesthetic substance, administered by or with the privity of the accused;
5. Where she is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act, and this is
known to the accused; 6. Where she submits under the belief that the person committing the act is her husband, and this belief is induced by an
artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to
induce such belief.
Section 261 now reads:
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eighteen.' 5 On appeal, the defendants contended that they could
not be convicted of statutory rape when the information had only
charged them with forcible rape. The court held that "[t]he decisive question ... is whether the variance was of such a substan-

tial character as to have misled defendants in preparing their
defense."'16 The court believed that the defendants were not
prejudiced and, under the circumstances of the case, the variance
was immaterial.17
In People v. Cole,'8 the appellate court construed and expanded
Collins in formulating a third test for lesser included offenses.
The defendant in Cole was charged with assault with intent to
commit murder.' 9 A jury found the defendant guilty of assault
with a deadly weapon, 20 as a lesser included offense within the
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the
spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances:
1. Where a person is incapable, through lunacy or other unsoundness
of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent.
2.

Where . . . it is accomplished against a person's will by means of

force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.
3. Where a person is prevented from resisting by... any intoxicating,
narcotic or anaesthetic substance, administered by or with the privity of
the accused.
4. Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act,
and this is known to the accused.
5. Where a person submits under the belief that the person committing
the act is the victim's spouse, and this belief is induced by any artifice,
pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to induce
such belief.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1981).
15. Subdivision (1) (d) of Section 261 has been repealed. See note 14 supra. A
separate statute, Section 261.5 was enacted in 1970 prohibiting sexual intercourse
with a female under 18 years of age. The text reads as follows: "Unlawful sexual
intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the
wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981).
16. 54 Cal. 2d at 60, 351 P.2d at 328, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
17. Id. The court cited the following factors in support of its determination
that defendants were not prejudiced: it was proved at the preliminary hearing
that the prosecuting witness was fifteen years of age; an attorney for one of the
defendants expressed the view that the evidence tended to show statutory rape
only, defendants did not claim that if rape in violation of section 261 had been expressly alleged that he would or could have disputed the age of the prosecuting
witness; and defendants were not in danger of double jeopardy.
18. See note 11 supra.
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 217 (West 1870) (repealed 1890).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a) (West 1970). The text reads as follows:
(a) Every person who commits an assault upon the person of another
with a deadly weapon or instrument or by any means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury is punishable by imprisonment in the state

charge of assault with intent to commit murder.
The Cole court first ruled out the two established tests for
lesser included offenses. With respect to the first test, the court
concluded that assault with intent to commit murder did not encompass all the elements of assault with a deadly weapon. With
respect to the second test, because the district attorney failed to
allege that the defendant employed a deadly weapon, the accusatory pleading requirements were not satisfied. The court then applied the language in Collins to reach its conclusion that the
convicted offense was a lesser included offense.
Between the Collins decision and the Cole decision, a number
of appellate courts had limited the Collins rationale to situations
involving different subdivisions of the same penal statute.2 1 The
Cole court was of the opinion that these cases "Ignor[ed] the underlying reasoning of the Collins case and exalt[ed] form over
substance." 2 2 ' The crux of the Collins decision is that a variance
between the offense charged and a lesser offense of which a defendant is ultimately convicted will be deemed material only if
the defendant was misled to his prejudice and prevented from
preparing an effective defense."23 Since the evidence at the preliminary hearing left no doubt that the assault involved use of a
deadly weapon, and the only question involved was the identity of
the perpetrator, the court held that the defendant's opportunity to
prepare and defend was in no way impaired by omitting the
charge from the information. Following the rationale of Collins,
the appellate court upheld the conviction.
People v. Muis24 followed Cole in applying this third test. The
defendant in Muis was convicted of unauthorized entry, but the
prison for two, three or four years, or in a county jail not exceeding one
year, or by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both

such fine and imprisonment. When a person is convicted of a violation of
this section, in a case involving use of a deadly weapon or instrument, and
such weapon or instrument is owned by such person, the court may, in its
discretion, order that the weapon or instrument be deemed a nuisance
and shall be confiscated and destroyed in the manner provided by Section
12028.
Id.
21. See People v. Tatem, 62 Cal. App. 3d 655, 133 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976) (theft
held not to be necessarily included within charge of burglary because burglary can
be committed without the commission of a theft); People v. Escarega, 43 Cal. App.
3d 391, 117 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1974) (exhibiting a deadly weapon as proscribed under
the California Penal Code §417, held not to be necessarily included offense within
charge of assault with a deadly weapon because an assault with a deadly weapon
can be committed without drawing or exhibiting the deadly weapon in a rude, angry or threatening manner as required under Section 417); People v. Leech, 232
Cal. App. 2d 397, 42 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1965) (same as Escarega).
22. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
23. Id.
24. See note 12 supra.
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information charged him with burglary. 25 The court explictly recognized that a third test had evolved from Collins, stating that the
decisive question was "whether the variance was of such a substantial character as to have misled defendants in preparing their
defense." 26 In applying this third test, the court held that the conviction for unauthorized entry was proper, because the defendant's opportunity to prepare and defend against the charge was
not impaired by the fact the offense was not charged in the information, adding that this omission did not result in a miscarriage
27
of justice.
Two additional decisions evidence that this third test was developing strength in the appellate courts. In re Beverly H.28 involved
a minor charged with assault with a deadly weapon. 29 The female
minor used a knife during a fight with another girl, inflicting cuts
to her opponent's body. The minor was convicted of battery as a
lesser included offense. The appellate court applied its interpretation of Collins to uphold the conviction. 30 In re Walter S.31 in25. See note 5 supra.
26. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 211, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
27. Id. at 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 795. In People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583
P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978),
the court stated that "Defense counsel suggested at oral argument that defendant probably could have been convicted of the lesser offense of unauthorized entry (Pen. Code § 602.5). Although unauthorized entry is not a
necessarily included offense within the crime of burglary, 'Ji]n determining whether one crime is a lesser included offense of another, courts ordinarily look to the specific of the accusatory pleading rather than to the
statutory definition of the greater crime.'
[Citation]. Arguably the information filed... adequately charged the lesser offense of unauthorized entry." Id. at 327 n.8, 583 P.2d at 1314 n.8, 149 Cal. Rptr. at
271 n.8. People v. Holderman, 64 Cal. App. 3d 375, 134 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1976) (trial
court was not in error for failing to instruct an alleged lesser included offense of
unlawful entry where, defendant entered no evidence existed to establish defendant entered without consent).
These cases at least suggest that an unauthorized entry can be a lesser included
offense within the charge of burglary, and the fact the defendant conceded that
sufficient facts existed to find an authorized entry, it would appear that the defendant in Muis had sufficient notice of a potential conviction for unauthorized
entry.
28. 103 Cal. App. 3d 1, 162 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1980).
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a) (West Supp. 1981).
30. ITIhere can be no doubt on the record before us that the minor's
counsel was aware of the facts upon which the alleged assault with a
deadly weapon and by force likely to produce great bodily injury was
based well before the adjudication hearing, and that the minor's opportunity to prepare and defend against a battery charge was in no manner impaired by the failure to allege the same in the petition.
103 Cal. Apo. 3d at 6, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
31. 105 Cal. App. 3d 475, 164 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1980).

volved a 16 year old charged with vehicle theft.32 Upon the
defendant's submission to the crime of joyriding 33 as a lesser included offense, the trial judge sustained a petition declaring the
minor a ward of the court. On appeal, the defendant contended
that joyriding is not a lesser included offense within the crime of
vehicle theft. The court, without ruling out the two established
tests for lesser included offenses, based its decision on the additional test of Collins, finding that joyriding and vehicle theft
"spring from the same basic legislative policy" and that the "variance had no effect whatsoever insofar as a defense posture was
concerned." 34
IV.

THE CouRT's ANALYSIS

In Lohbauer, the Supreme Court of California clarified the Collins holding and disapproved of those appellate cases taking an
alternative construction.3 5 The court stated that
"[t]he rationale of Collins was that one charged with forcible rape could
be convicted of 'statutory rape' under the same statute, provided he had
adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense....
Collins had neither redefined a 'necessarily included'

offense within the meaning of Section 1159, nor departed from the
32. CAL. VEH. CODE § 10851 (West Supp. 1981). The text reads as follows:
Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either permanently or temporarily to deprive the owner thereof of his title to or possession of the vehicle,
whether with or without intent to steal the same, or any person who is a
party or accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing is guilty of a public offense, and upon conviction thereof
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison .

. . ,

or in the

county jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than five
thousand dollars ($5,000) or both such fine and imprisonment. The consent of the owner of a vehicle to its taking or driving shall not in any case
be presumed or implied because of such owner's consent on a previous occasion to the taking or driving of the vehicle by the same or a different
person.
Id.
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 499(b) (West 1970). The text reads as follows:
Any person who shall, without the permission of the owner thereof take
any automobile, bicycle, motorcycle, or other vehicle or motorboat or vessel, for the purpose of temporarily using or operating the same, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200), or by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
Id.
34. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 481, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 445. The court also noted that the
defense counsel's desire to submit to having the judge consider joyriding a lesser
included offense attests to the nonsubstantial nature of the variance.
35. "Collins is not authority for any expanded definition of 'necessarily included' offenses. To the extent that Walter S., Beverly H., Muis, and Cole ...
adopt such a construction, they are disapproved." 29 Cal. 3d at 372, 627 P.2d at 187,
173 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
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rule of that statute; it had held only that rape was one crime
36
within that meaning."
The supreme court held that the adoption of this third test
would violate well settled interpretations of statutory language.
The court based this conclusion on its prior decisions which have
uniformly interpreted the language "necessarily included" of the
Penal Code3 7 as being restricted to the traditional tests. 38 The
court found no satisfactory argument for modification of the tradi39
tional tests.
The court noted that even if the new test was compatible with
Section 1159, serious due process problems would arise. In essence, the problem would be one of trying to determine when the
test had been met. The language "misled to his prejudice" and
"prevented from preparing an effective defense" would be difficult
to ascertain. 40 The present case posed such a problem for the
court. The People argued that the defendant could not have been
misled because the evidence at the preliminary hearing established the specific conduct upon which the accusation was based.
The court, however, believed that when an essential element of
36. Id. at 372, 627 P.2d at 186, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 456. This is the point Chief Justice Bird addresses in her concurring opinion. She would override Collins because "[u]nder that decision, a person charged with begging (Pen. Code § 647,
subd. (b), could be convicted of prostitution (Pen. Code § 647, subd. (b)), on the
theory that the various subdivisions of Penal Code section 647 do not state different offenses, but merely define the different circumstances in which one may commit the misdemeanor of disorderly conduct." 29 Cal. 3d at 373-74, 627 P.2d at 187-88,
173 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58.
37. CAL PENAL CODE § 1159 (West 1970).
38. Id. at 370, 627 P.2d at 185, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 455. The court is referring to
People v. Pendleton, 25 Cal. 3d 371, 599 P.2d 649, 158 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1979) and People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 184 P.2d 512 (1947). In Pendleton, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on unauthorized entry as a lesser included offense
within the crime of burglary. The supreme court upheld on the basis that an entry
need not be a trespass to support the charge of burglary, therefore, it is not necessarily included. In Greer, the defendant was convicted of both statutory rape and
lewd and lascivious conduct. The court held that both crimes can be charged, but
since lewd and lascivious conduct is necessarily included within the crime of statutory conduct, there can only be one conviction.
39. It appears from the decision that the People's argument was that the court
should adopt a third test, not modify the traditional tests. Once the court rejected
this third test, the question then became whether the traditional tests should be
modified. Perhaps if a persuasive argument for modification had been made, the
court might have responded with reasoning why the traditional tests should not be
modified. However, it would appear that if a persuasive argument for modification
were made, and such modification would continue to insure the defendants due
process rights, the court would consider it.
40. 29 Cal. 3d at 370, 627 P.2d at 185, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 455.

the crime charged is intent, notice of conduct is not sufficient to
give the defendant notice of the crimes which may be proved
against him.41 The court also noted that the trial court concluded
that the defendant was not put on notice, but "is at least guilty of
trespass" and "ought to" be convicted of that offense. 42 The court
concluded that even if the new test were adopted, the record did
not indicate that the test had been satisfied.43
V.

CONCLUSION

The Lohbauer decision eliminates ambiguities that may have
existed with respect to the test for lesser included offenses. The
major impact of Lohbauer will be to prevent the appellate courts
from sustaining a conviction for a lesser offense, not necessarily
included within the charged offense, when the traditional tests
have not been satisfied. The Lohbauer decision is correct since
the appellate court's third test did not effectively insure a defendant's due process rights. No longer will the prosecution be able to
look to the appellate courts to correct insufficient accusatory
pleadings. A heightened burden will again be placed on the prosecution to insure that a defendant has notice of any lesser offenses for which he may be convicted.
II. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. ATrORNEY DISCIPLINE
1. Mitigation of DisbarmentRecommendations:
In re Petty
In re Petty' addressed the issue arising in the situation where
the State Bar Court recommends that an attorney be disbarred
for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,2 whether
41. "[W] here the actor's state of mind is an essential element of an offense, as
where it is charged that the entry is 'with the intent to commit theft,' notice of
'conduct' alone cannot be said fairly to forewarn a defendant of the specific crimes
which may be proven against him." Id. at 370, 627 P.2d at 185-86, 173 Cal. Rptr. at

455-56.
42. Id. at 371, 627 P.2d at 186, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
43. All of this leads us to a conclusion that even under the test proposed
by the People, we could not fairly conclude from the record before us that
defendant was not 'misled to his prejudice and thereby prevented from
preparing an effective defense.' The difficulties readily apparent in attempting such a factual inquiry in the course of appellate review do not
commend for adoption the proposed new definition.
Id.
1. 29 Cal. 3d 356, 627 P.2d 191, 173 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1981).
2. "Criminal acts involving intentional dishonesty for the purpose of personal
gain are acts involving moral turpitude." In re Hallinan, 48 Cal. 2d 52, 54, 307 P.2d
1,2 (1957).
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youth, inexperience, and restitution may mitigate the attorney's
actions constituting a basis for the supreme court to reject the
recommendation as being excessive?
Petitioner Petty was convicted on eight counts of grand thefts
and four counts of forgery. 4 Petitioner McCray, Petty's partner,5
was convicted on two counts of grand theft and one count of forgery. 6 The State Bar Court consolidated the two actions into one
hearing. Their recommendation was that both petitioners be disbarred. The review department affirmed the recommendation. 7
When such actions are presented before the court for its determination of proper discipline, great weight is given to the recommendation of the hearing panel.8 The court, however, is not
bound by the recommendation. 9 Petitioner has the burden of
showing that the recommendation was erroneous.' 0
In the proper circumstances, financial and personal problems as
well as alcoholism and rehabilitation are properly considered as
mitigating circumstances in determining the appropriate discipline." Also, an attorney's prior disciplinary record may be taken
CAL. PENAL CODE § 487 (West 1970).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 470 (West 1970). An additional forty counts were
dismissed.
5. The parties established a law partnership in January, 1972.
6. See notes 3 and 4 supra. An additional forty-two counts were dismissed.
7. Petty requested the review and the department made independent findings of fact as to Petty; as to McCray the hearing panel's findings were adopted.
8. See Olguin v. State Bar of Calif., 28 Cal. 3d 195, 616 P.2d 858, 167 Cal. Rptr.
876 (1980); Di Sabatino v. State Bar of Calif., 27 Cal. 3d 159, 606 P.2d 765, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 458 (1980); Lewis v. State Bar, 9 Cal. 3d 704, 511 P.2d 1173, 108 Cal. Rptr. 821

3.

(1973).

9. See Olguin v. State Bar of Calif., 28 Cal. 3d 195, 616 P.2d 858, 167 Cal. Rptr.
876 (1980); Di Sabatino v. State Bar of Calif., 27 Cal. 3d 159, 606 P.2d 765, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 458 (1980); see also Finch v. State Bar of Calif., 28 Cal. 3d 659, 621 P.2d 253, 170
Cal. Rptr. 629 (1981) (court indicates a more severe penalty may be imposed).
10. Kitsis v. State Bar, 23 Cal. 3d 857, 592 P.2d 323, 153 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1979);
Hawkins v. State Bar, 23 Cal. 3d 622, 591 P.2d 524, 153 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1979); In re
Abbott, 19 Cal. 3d 249, 561 P.2d 285, 137 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1977).
11. Motives, previous record, character and reputation, youth and inexperience, client's character and other circumstances have been properly considered.
See 7 CAL. JuR. 3d, Attorneys at Law § 150 (1973).
Whether the court will consider something as a mitigating factor depends upon
the circumstances of that particular case. The court may be sympathetic to one's
problems but decline to use it as a mitigating factor because their "primary concern must be the fulfillment of proper professional standards, whatever the unfortunate cause" may be. In re Abbott, 19 Cal. 3d at 254, 561 P.2d at 288, 137 Cal. Rptr.
at 198, citing from In re Duggan, 17 Cal. 3d 416, 423, 551 P.2d 1922, 130 Cal. Rptr. 715,
718 (1976), and Grove v. State Bar of Calif., 66 Cal. 2d 680, 427 P.2d 164, 58 Cal. Rptr.
564 (1967).

into account.12 The court, in the instant case, rejected this factor
due to the brief period of practice prior to the attorneys' misconduct. Disbarment is not reserved for attorneys possessing prior
misconduct records.' 3 Discipline must be based on a "balanced
consideration of all relevant factors," which include any mitigating circumstances.14 "Our guiding principal is that the purpose of
A disciplinary proceeding is not punitive but to inquire into the
fitness of the attorney to continue in that capacity for the protec5
tion of the public, the court, and the legal profession."
The court declared that youth and inexperience are not mitigating factors where criminal conduct is interwoven with the practice of law.' 6 Restitution does not establish the "requisite
rehabilitation"17 sufficient to excuse the petitioners' conduct and,
therefore, allow the supreme court to reject the recommendation
of the State Bar Court.
B.

ArrORNEY-CLENT RELATIONSHIP

1. Limitations Upon the California Attorney General: People v. Brown
Without reaching the merits in the case of People v. Brown,' the
California Supreme Court issued an order enjoining the Califor12. McMorris v. State Bar of Calif., 29 Cal. 3d 96, 623 P.2d 781, 171 Cal. Rptr. 829
(1981); Samuelsen v. State Bar of Calif., 23 Cal. 3d 558, 591 P.2d 15, 152 Cal. Rptr.
918 (1979); Jackson v. State Bar of Calif., 23 Cal. 3d 509, 591 P.2d 47, 153 Cal. Rptr. 24
(1979).
13. In re Weber, 16 Cal. 3d 578, 546 P.2d 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1976).
14. Doyle v. State Bar of Calif., 15 Cal. 3d 973, 979, 544 P.2d 937, 939, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 801, 803 (1976).
15. Id. at 978, 544 P.2d at 939, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 803, citing from Bradpiece v.
State Bar of Calif., 10 Cal. 3d 742, 748, 518 P.2d 337, 341, 111 Cal. Rptr. 905, 909 (1974).
See also Demian v. State Bar, 3 Cal. 3d 381, 386, 475 P.2d 652, 654, 90 Cal. Rptr. 420,
422 (1970), and Clancy v. State Bar, 71 Cal. 2d 140, 151, 454 P.2d 329, 336, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 657, 664 (1969). See also Jackson v. State Bar of Calif., 23 Cal. 3d 509, 591 P.2d
47, 153 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1978).
16. The nature of petitioners' actions were not such that most young and inexperienced lawyers would take such action. 29 Cal. 3d at 361, 627 P.2d at 194, 173
Cal. Rptr. at 464 (1981).
17. Id. at 362, 627 P.2d at 194, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 464. The court indicates that rehabilitation is more effectively considered during a reinstatement proceeding.
1. 29 Cal. 3d 150, 624 P.2d 1206, 172 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1981). The Pacific Legal
Foundation and the Public Employees Service Association filed an original petition for a writ of mandate to compel the Governor, the State Controller, the Public
Employment Relations Board, and the State Personnel Board to perform their
constitutional and statutory duties without regard to the provisions of the State
Employer-Employee Relations Act. This Act, set forth at CAr. GOV'T. CODE § 3512
(West 1980), basically lists procedure for the formation of state employees' organizations, meetings and rules criteria, and mediation guidelines in the event of a dispute between the Governor and recognized employee organizations.
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nia State Attorney General from proceeding with a petition for a
writ of mandate against the California Governor and other state
entities and officials.
Prior to filing the petition for the writ of mandate, the Attorney
2
General had acted as counsel for the State in the same lawsuit.
After reviewing the provisions of the State Employer-Employee
Relations Act of 1978 (SEERA),3 he determined the provisions
were unconstitutional and thus filed suit against the Governor
and the State, thereby attempting to compel them to perform
their duties without regard to SEERA.
Without reviewing the constitutionality of SEERA, the California Supreme Court found that the Attorney General had
breached the confidentiality of his attorney-client relationship
with the State and surmised that it could "find no constitutional,
statutory, or ethical authority for such conduct by the Attorney
General."4 While the court acknowledged the Attorney General
to be both a representative of a state agency and the guardian of
the public interest, it felt that any personal conflict should be resolved by withdrawal of the Attorney General as state counsel. 5
Furthermore, the court found that in a situation such as this,
where there is a conflict between the Governor and the Attorney
General over the determination of the public interest, the Governor retains the "supreme executive power." 6 The court believed
that the Attorney General, as the chief law officer of the State,
7
was subject to the power and duties of the Governor.
Although the court noted that many states permit their attorneys general to sue state officers or agencies, 8 it felt that these
2. Acting through two deputies, the Attorney General met with members of
the State Personnel Board, who had already been served with process in the suit,
and, as their counsel, outlined the legal possibilities and described their options.
29 Cal. 3d at 154, 624 P.2d at 1207, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
3. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 3512 (West 1980). While the Governor had this bill
under consideration, the Attorney General urged him to sign what he described as
"a standard, well-accepted method of resolving labor/management disputes... a
good step forward." 29 Cal. 3d at 155, 624 P.2d at 1207, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
4. 29 Cal. 3d at 155, 624 P.2d at 1207, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
5. Id. at 157, 624 P.2d at 1209, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 481. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE
§ 11040 (West 1980); D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 520, 786 P.2d 10 (1974).
6. 29 Cal. 3d at 157-58, 624 P.2d at 1209, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 481 (quoting CAI_
CONST. art. 4, § 1).
7. CAL. CONST., art. 5, § 13.
8. Connecticut Comm'n v. Connecticut Freedom of Information Comm'n, 174
Conn. 308, 387 A.2d 533 (1978); Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d

precedents were not persuasive in California. The court found
the Constitution of Arizona and case law interpreting it more in
line with those of California and chose to follow the ruling of the
Arizona Supreme Court in Arizona State Land Dept. v. McFate,9
which held that the governor alone, and not the attorney general,
is responsible for the supervision of the state executive
department.10

HI.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. WELFARE LAw
1. Allowable Expenses Under the Social Security Act: Green v. Obledo

The California Supreme Court decision in Green v. ObledoI concerned a California state welfare regulation, EAS 44-113.241(d),2
which established a per-mile standard allowance for expenses of
driving a private motor vehicle to and from work and on the job,
and set forth a maximum limit on the recognition of those expenses. The Green court held that this statute failed to provide
for individualized consideration of expenses in excess of the standard amount and thus was invalid due to its violation of the Social Security Act.3
1262 (1977), EPA v. Pollution Control Bd., 69 1ll. 2d 399, 372 N.E.2d 50 (1977); Commonwealth v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. App. 1974).
9. 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960).
10. The Arizona Supreme Court held:
Significantly, these powers are not vested in the Attorney General. Thus,
the Governor alone, and not the Attorney General, is responsible for the
supervision of the executive department and is obligated and empowered
to protect the interests of the people and the State by taking care that the
laws are faithfully executed.
Id. at 148, 348 P.2d at 918.
1. 29 Cal. 3d 126, 624 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1981). Plaintiffs, Aid to Famities with Dependent Children recipients, alleged in a class action suit that their
employment required use of automobiles for transportation to and from work.
Such use resulted in costs which greatly exceeded mileage-based deductions
when determining need for assistance, and thus served to reduce monthly grants.
The action attacked the compliance of a state welfare regulation with the language
set forth under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976).
2. This statute enumerates certain work related expenses allowable as deductions from earned income used to determine eligibility for and amount of
AFDC assistance. Regulation subdivision (d) states:
recipient's necessary costs of transportation to and from work shall be allowed; but in the case of a recipient who is compelled to use his or her
own automobile for that purpose because public transportation is either
unavailable or inappropriate, the regulation limits those costs to a flat rate
of 15 cents per mile.
EAS 44-113.241(d).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (1976). The Act provides that in determining need, a
state agency shall take into consideration any-expenses reasonably attributable to
the earning of other income.
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Consistent with prior law,4 the supreme court reiterated that
when determining eligibility for an amount of so-called Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)5 assistance, it was the
intent of Congress to permit the exclusion of all work related expenses, without regard to the amount expended, provided that
such expenses were reasonably related to employment. 6 In addition, Health, Education, and Welfare regulations consider only actual available net income in their determinations of aid; thus,
such work related expenses serve to reduce current support

needs and therefore must be adjudged.7 The court also reasoned

that average per-mile allowances would not be practical in light of
the fact that most automobiles used by families in need of aid are
in below average condition, and that many expenses are often not
8
related to mileage.
The Green court continued to follow precedent in its conclusion
that procedural class action issues, including composition of the
class, must ordinarily be resolved prior to a decision on the merits.9 This prevents one-way intervention on the part of potential
class members and also may alleviate a binding adjudication
against that class.10 Furthermore, this rule protects plaintiffs
4. See Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974). See also County of Alameda v.
Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 488 P.2d 953, 97 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1971), in which the court
emphasized "if these work expenses are not considered in determining need, they
have the effect of providing a disincentive to working since that portion of family
budget spent for work expenses has the effect of reducing the amount available for
food, clothing, and shelter."
5. The AFDC program was established by the federal Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1976) with the goal of providing financial assistance to needy
dependent children and the parents or other relatives with whom they reside.
This program is controlled by federal financial assistance and state administrative
efforts. California participates in this program under the provision of the BurtonMiller Act, CAI WELF. AND INST. CODE, § 11200 (West 1980). 29 Cal. 3d at 131, 624
P.2d at 528, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 208 (1981).
6. County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 488 P.2d 953, 97 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1971); [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 1959-60.
7. Id.
8. 29 Cal. 3d at 139, 624 P.2d at 263, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 213. Major costs include
monthly payments on car loans, insurance premiums, depreciation, and licensing
and registration fees. In addition, second-hand cars often consume more oil and
require additional mechanical maintenance.
9. Home Say. & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 208, 211-14, 126
Cal. Rptr. 511, 512-14 (1976); Hypolite v. Carleson, 52 Cal. App. 3d 566, 125 Cal. Rptr.
221 (1975). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(1) (West 1954) states that a liability created by statute, was subject to the three year limitations period. However, the
trial court has discretion to fix a more realistic date for payment of retroactive
benefits to class member to avoid excessiveness.
10. 29 Cal. 3d at 146, 624 P.2d at 268, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (1981).

from possible abuse by a defendant of a delayed motion to decertify the class." Although, as a general rule, the issuance of a writ
of mandate is restricted to persons "beneficially interested," the
Green court sustained prior law which allowed an exception to instances dealing with a public right and a public duty.12
The supreme court held that the appellant's retroactive relief
should be restricted to the period preceding the filing of the
13
complaint.
iv.

LABOR LAW
A. LIABILrrY FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
1. A Growers Liability For the Unfair Labor
Practicesof a Labor ContractorUnder
the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act:
Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board

The central question in Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board' was whether a grower who obtains workers
through a farm labor contractor 2 may be held responsible under
the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA) for actions of that labor contractor which constitute unfair labor
practice. 3
In this case, the actions of the labor contractor were held to
constitute unfair labor practice. 4 The actions consisted of pushing, shoving, and threatening to fight with union organizers who
had gone to the contractor's camp to speak with the farm workers
about an upcoming union certification election.S When an argu11. Id. at 147, 624 P.2d at 268, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
12. Holman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351, 196 P.2d 562 (1948); American Friends

Serv. Comm. v. Procunier, 33 Cal. App. 3d 252, 109 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1973). Fuller v.
San Bernardino Valley Mun. Wat. Dist., 242 Cal. App. 2d 52, 51 Cal. Rptr. 120
(1969).
13. 29 Cal. 3d at 141, 624 P.2d at 265, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
1. 29 Cal. 3d 307, 625 P.2d 263, 172 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1981).
2. The appellant, Vista Verde Farms, had only ten or twelve permanent employees who worked the full period that the farm was open. However, during peak
season, up to 600 employees were needed for farm worker crews. During this time,
Vista Verde hired labor contractors who, in turn, supplied Vista Verde with farm
worker crews.
3. What is contemplated is an imputation of liability from an independent
contractor to the employer, via reference to the broad purposes underlying the
statutory scheme, as opposed to general agency or respondent superior principles.
4. 29 Cal. 3d at 316, 625 P.2d at 267, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
5. The union organizers went to the labor contractor's camp to speak with the
workers since many of the workers employed by Vista Verde were living at the
camp and none of the workers would be able to return to Vista Verde before the
union certification election. 29 Cal. 3d at 313-14, 625 P.2d at 266, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
723.
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ment ensued as to the union organizers' right to speak with the
farm workers in their own homes, the labor contractor departed
and returned later with several deputy sheriffs. The union organizers were cited for trespass and told to leave the premises
immediately. The court found that these actions of the labor contractor constituted unfair labor practice in that they were an improper interference with, coercion, and restraint of workers in the
exercise of their statutorily protected rights under Labor Code
section 1153.6 The significance of the case lies in its resolution of
the issue as to whether, and under what theory, liability for an
unfair labor practice can be imputed from the labor contractor to
the grower under California law.
The court embarked upon an extensive analysis of both federal
and state law, 7 which concluded, generally, that under the ALRA
an employer may be held responsible for any improper and coercive actions which his employees may reasonably believe were either engaged in on the employer's behalf or reflect the employer's
policy. 8 The court further concluded that, under the ALRA, these
general principles of employer responsibility apply equally to the
coercive actions of a farm labor contractor hired by a grower as
they do to similar conduct engaged in by a regular employee of
such a grower.9
Although this conclusion does not contemplate imposition of a
strict form of liability upon a grower for the wrongful actions of
his labor contractor, 10 it is important, nonetheless, because it sig6. Labor Code § 1153 provides in pertinent part that "[i]t shall be an unfair
labor practice for an agricultural employer to [inter alia] . . . interfere with, re-

strain, or coerce agricultural employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 1152." CA. LAB. CODE § 1153 (West 1980).
Labor Code § 1152 provides in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ....
Id. § 1152.
7. The court noted that the drafters of the ALRA drew heavily upon the provisions of its federal counterpart, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and
thereafter proceeded to analyze portions of it and some of the applicable federal
precedents which followed its passage, most notably I.A. of M. v. Labor Bd., 311
U.S. 72 (1940), and H.J. Heinz Co. v. Labor Bd., 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
8. 29 Cal. 3d at 312, 625 P.2d at 265, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
9. Id.
10. In fact, the court expressly rejected such a contention:
Inasmuch as the employer is not 'strictly' or 'absolutely' liable even for

nals a new approach by California courts in dealing with unfair labor practices on the part of labor contractors." The court
believed that this new approach would better protect the worker's
2
rights and deter similar coercive conduct in the future.'
V. CONTRACT LAW

A.

CONSIDERATION

1. Mutuality of Obligation and the Sufficiency
of Consideration: Bleecher v. Conte
In Bleecher v. Conte,' the California Supreme Court was
presented with the contractual issues of mutuality of obligation
and the availability of specific performance as a remedy where
the other party has waived that right in a liquidated damages
clause. 2 Agreeing with the trial court, the court found that the
buyers' promise to "do everything in their power to expedite the
recordation of the final map"3 and to "proceed with due diligence"
was a sufficient obligation to supply adequate consideration. 4
the actions of its own supervisors or foremen under all circumstances, we

believe that if the Legislature had intended to enact such a strict liability
standard with respect to labor contractor misconduct it would have done
so in clearer, more explicit terms.
29 Cal. 3d at 326, 625 P.2d at 273, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (emphasis in original).
The court went on to give examples of types of misconduct on the part of the
labor contractor for which the grower would not be responsible.
11. People v. Medrano, 78 Cal. App. 3d 198, 144 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1978) took the
position that any actions taken by labor contractors were not subject to review

under the ALRA; this position was expressly disapproved in Vista Verde Farms, 29
Cal. 3d at 325, 625 P.2d at 273, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
12. 29 Cal. 3d at 312, 625 P.2d at 265, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
1. 29 Cal. 3d 345, 626 P.2d 1051, 173 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1981). The unanimous decision was authored by Chief Justice Bird.
2. The contract at issue centered around the sale of forty acres of land in
Palm Desert, California. The contracting parties were experienced business persons dealing in real estate transactions. The original contract offer tendered by
the buyers provided for a $1000 deposit to open escrow, twenty-nine percent to be
paid at the close of escrow and the balance to be paid within five years. The closing of escrow was conditioned upon the buyers' approval and recordation of the
final tract map. The seller rejected the offer, but made a signed counteroffer. The
terms of the original offer remained the same, but a provision was added stipulating that the entire purchase price, $575,000, should be paid in cash. The buyers accepted the counteroffer and deposited $1000 in escrow. The controversy arose
when the seller refused to proceed with the arrangement unless the buyers paid
the entire purchase price in the current year rather than over the five year period.
This conditioned refusal was a material alteration in the terms of the contract.
3. The buyers' obligation to pay was contingent upon their approval of the title report, plat map, and soil, zoning, and engineering reports. This approval could
not be unreasonably withheld.
4. The agreement was a bilateral contract in which each party is both a promisor and a promisee. The mutuality of obligation supplies the requisite consideration to make the contract binding. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1932).
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The court held that for a contract to bind either party, there
must be mutuality of obligation.5 It further noted that "in every
contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" 6 and also that if a contract is capable of two constructions,
the court must choose the interpretation which makes the contract legally binding, if it can be so construed without violating
the intentions of the parties. 7 The court rejected the seller's argument for voiding the contract on the basis that the buyers had not
assumed any real obligation.8 Both the express and implied covenants to proceed with due diligence made the contract binding.
Additionally, the court found that even though a liquidated
damages clause existed in the contract that limited the seller's
remedy to possession of all completed maps and records in the
event of default by the buyers, the clause in no way precluded the
buyers' from asserting their contractual remedy of specific performance. The court held that the "rigid and outdated requirement of mutuality of remedy" was discarded by the California
Legislature. 9 The authors of the Restatement of Contracts likewise profess that "the fact that the remedy of specific enforcement is not available to one party is not sufficient for refusing it
to the other party."lO Thus, the seller's waiver of her right to specific performance in the liquidated damages clause did not prevent the buyers from availing themselves of that remedy.
5. See Mattei v. Hopper, 51 Cal. 2d 119, 122, 330 P.2d 625, 626 (1958). See also
§ 3391 (West 1978).
6. Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949); Redke
v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 100, 490 P.2d 805, 808, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293, 296, cert. denied,
CAL. Crv. CODE

405 U.S. 1041 (1971).
7. Rodriguez v. Barrett, 52 Cal. 2d 154, 160, 338 P.2d 907 (1959); CAL. Crv. CODE
§§ 1643, 3541 (West 1970).
8. The seller contended that the buyers' promise was illusory because the
buyers could decline to have a tract map prepared or obtain city approval for development, renege on the agreement, and still get their $1000 escrow deposit back.
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3386 (West 1970).

Notwithstanding that the agreed counterperformance is not or would not
have been specifically enforceable, specific performance may be compelled if(a) Specific performance would otherwise be an appropriate remedy;
and,

(b) The agreed counterperformance has been substantially perfornmed or
its concurrent or future performance is assured, or, if the court deems
necessary, can be secured to the satisfaction of the court.
10. RESTATEMENT OF CoNRAcTs § 372 (1932).

VI.

INSURANCE LAW

A. Automobile Liability Insurance
1. California Insurance Code Section 11580.1:
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Cocking
In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Cocking,' the California
Supreme Court resolved a constitutional challenge to section
11580.1, subdivision (c)(5) of the California Insurance Code,2
which authorizes automobile liability insurers to exclude from
coverage an insured's bodily injury liability to any other person
insured under the policy.
The defendants attacked the Code section on two grounds.
First, it was contended that the exclusion provision violated public policy and a general policy favoring adequate recovery for persons injured in automobile accidents. The court noted that such
arguments have been repeatedly rejected by the courts3 and that
such exclusion provisions have enjoyed judicial sanction since
1966.4 The court further noted that, in light of this authority, the
legislature in 1970 amended section 11580.1 to expressly permit
1. 29 Cal. 3d 383, 628 P.2d 1, 173 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1981). The defendant, Ceclia
Glorious, wife of defendant Paul Cocking, was injured while a passenger in a car
driven by her husband. She sued her husband for damages, alleging that her injuries were caused by his negligence. The plaintiff, Farmers Insurance, in seeking to
avoid indemnifying Cocking under the automobile liability policy it had issued to
him, brought a declaratory relief action to determine their liability under the insurance policy. The plaintiff, Farmers, relied upon an exclusion in its policy with
Cocking which read: "[T]his policy does not apply under Part I (liability insurance) ... to the liability of any insured for bodily injury to (a) the named insured
or (b) a relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household."
Another relevant portion of the policy provided that "[iif the insured named in
Item 1 of the declarations is an individual, the term 'named insured' includes his
spouse if a resident of the same household." It is undisputed that at the time of
the accident, the defendant, Glorious, was defendant Cocking's wife living with
him in the same household. All parties agreed that the exclusion, if valid, would
bar recovery for bodily injury sustained by the defendant Glorious. Id. at 386.
2. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1 (c) (West 1972) provides in relevant part: "In addition to any exclusion as provided in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), the insurance afforded by any such policy of automobile liability insurance to which
subdivision (a) applies may, by appropriate policy provision, be made inapplicable
[ ] (5) Liability for bodily injury to an insured."
to ...
3. Cooper v. Bray, 21 Cal. 3d 841, 582 P.2d 604 148 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1978);
Schwalbe v. Jones, 16 Cal. 3d 514, 546 P.2d 1033, 128 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1976) (overruled
on other grounds); California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Hoskin, 82 Cal. App. 789, 147
Cal. Rptr. 348 (1978); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hartle, 59 Cal. App. 3d 852,
131 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1976); Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co. v. Klapper, 59 Cal. App. 3d
918, 130 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1976); Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Woolum, 52 Cal. App. 3d 167, 123
Cal. Rptr. 613 (1975).
4. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Colonial Ins. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 227, 51 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1966) was the first reported California case to uphold the provision in question, clearly implying that such provisions were available and in use in California
long before the date of that case. Id. at 234-35 n.7. It is likely that the 1961 legisla-
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such exclusions.5 Earlier in Schwalbe v. Jones,6 the court took judicial notice of the fact that most automobile liability insurance
policies contain such exclusion provisions and that "[a]ny suggestion ... that this practice would contravene some vaguely
conceived public policy ... must surely founder upon the explicit
'7
language used by the Legislature to authorize such exclusions.
The defendants further maintained that section 11580.1 contravenes a basic public policy expressed in California Civil Code section 1714, subdivsion (a),8 making every person responsible for
his own negligent acts. The court responded that section 11580.1
is not contrary to the policy expressed in the Civil Code since an
injured party, such as the defendant, still retains the full unrestricted right to sue the negligent insured. The exclusion, the
court continued, affects only the right to reach insurance proceeds
for the satisfaction of any judgment obtained. As to the defendants' reliance on general principles favoring recovery for injuries,
the court held that "the public policy of this state is contained not
in broadly expressed generalized abstractions but in the applicable statutory provisions themselves . . ."9 which expressly allow
such exclusionary provisions in automobile liability insurance
policies.10 The court found that the Legislature's decision to auture, in passing the pre-1973 version of § 17158, did so in full awareness of the prevalence of such provisions.
5. 16 Cal. 3d at 521, 546 P.2d at 1038, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
6. Id.
7. Id. Although the precise holding in Schwalbe was overruled by the court
in Cooper v. Bray, 21 Cal. 3d 841, 582 P.2d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1978), nothing the
court said in Cooper casts any doubt upon the validity of the exclusion authorized
by § 11580.1. "Cooper's holding was directed solely to the propriety of the substantive immunity granted to negligent drivers vis-a-vis owner-passengers under Vehicle Code section 17158." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cocking, 29 Cal. 3d at 388, 628 P.2d
at 3, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 848. No similar grant of immunity from suit was involved in
Farmers.
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (West Supp. 1981) reads in relevant part: "Every
one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury
occassioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of
his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself."
9. 29 Cal. 3d at 388, 628 P.2d at 3, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
10. CAL INS. CODE § 11580.5 (West Supp. 1981) expressly recites that:
The Legislature declares that the public policy of this state in regard to
provisions authorized or required to be included in policies affording automobile liability insurance or motor vehicle liability insurance issuedor delivered in this state shall be as stated in this article, [and] that this article
expresses the total public policy of this state respecting the contents of
such policies ....

Id.

thorize automobile insurers to exclude bodily injury liability to an
insured is supported by a variety of rational, legitimate reasons."1
The second major attack by the defendants on section 11580.1
was that it violated the equal protection provisions of the state
and federal constitutions. The defendants maintained that the exclusion provision was irrational and arbitrary.12 The court, however, held that the provision rationally relates to a legitimate state
purpose. 13 Citing a recent Indiana case,14 the court pointed out
such reasons as prevention of suspect interfamily legal actions,
which may not be truly adversary and over which the insurer has
little or no control, collusive assertions of liability, and the freedom of parties to exclude risks from an insurance contract.' 5 The
court also observed16 that the legislature may have concluded
that the benefits to the public from automatically including "family member" coverage in all automobile liability policies were outweighed by the probable adverse consequences of such a rule,
including substantial increases in premiums. Such a substantial
increase could also result in more uninsured motorists. Further,
family members are frequently protected by medical provisions of
the insured's policy, or by other medical or casualty insurance.
For the above reasons, and in avoidance of unprecedented judicial interference into private contractual and economic arrangements between contracting parties,17 the court reversed the
judgment of the trial court and directed it to enter judgment for
the plaintiffs.
11. 29 Cal. 3d at 388, 628 P.2d at 3, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
12. The plaintiff "Farmers answered the equal protection challenge by con-

tending, alternatively, that (1) there is no state action upon which to invoke
equal protection principles, and (2) in any event, section 11580.1 is supported by
sufficient rational bases." 29 Cal. 3d at 389, 628 P.2d at 4, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 849. As
the second contention was clearly meritorious, the court did not see a need to
reach the state action issue.
13. As noted by the court, the applicable review standard for testing the constitutionality of § 11580.1, subdivision (c) (5) is the so-called "traditional" or "restrained" standard which requires courts to uphold the validity of a legislative

classification if it rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose. Under this standard, the judiciary affords challenged legislation a presumption of constitutional-

ity. Cooper v. Bray, 21 Cal. 3d at 847, 582 P.2d at 607, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 151; Newland
v. Board of Governors, 19 Cal. 3d 705, 566 P.2d 254, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1977).
14. United Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hanley, 172 Ind. App. 321, 360 N.E.2d 247
(1977).
15. Id.
16. 29 Cal. 3d at 390, 628 P.2d at 4, 173 Cal. Rptr at 849.
17. Id. at 390-91, 628 P.2d at 5, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
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VII.

CALIFORNIA CONSTITION
A.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY
1.

Medi-Cal Funding of Abortions-The Right
of Procreative Choice is Guaranteed:
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers
The 1978-80 California Budget Acts restricted funding for abortions
under the California Medi-Cal Program. The California Supreme Court
held that the right to procreative choice is a fundamental right under the
California Constitution and can only be restrictedpursuant to a compelling state interest The court applied the three-part test establishedin Bagley v. Washington Toumship Hospital District and found that no
compelling state interest existed.

I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court, in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers', continued its firmly established trend of
guaranteeing greater rights and protection under the California
Constitution. than those granted by the United States Constitution. The Myers decision clearly reinforced this trend. Just nine
months earlier, in Harris v. McRae 2 , the United States Supreme
Court upheld provisions similar to those struck down as unconsti3
tutional in Myers.
1. 9 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). The majority opinion
was written by Justice Tobriner, with Justices Mosk and Newman concurring.
Chief Justice Bird wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Richardson, with
Justice Clark concurring, authored the dissent.
2. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). McRae upheld certain restrictions on federal funding
of abortions. For an indepth analysis of the United States Supreme Court's application of the federal constitution to the Hyde Amendment, see Harris v. McRae:
Whatever Happened to the Roe v. Wade Abortion Right? 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 861
(1981).
3. The Meyers decision clearly holds that the rights of the fetus are
subordinate to the woman's right of procreative choice prior to the third trimester.
The rationale of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was adopted to protect the rights
of the fetus during the third trimester. See notes 63 &64 infra. The effect of McRae, in contrast, was to subordinate the woman's right of procreative choice to the
rights of the fetus. These results do not appear to be distinguishable on divergent
policies favoring the rights of the mother vis-a-vis the child or vice-versa. Rather,
any distinctions should be primarily based on the level of scrutiny employed. The
United States Supreme Court used a minimum scrutiny test by merely looking to
see whether any new obstacles to abortion were imposed. The California
Supreme Court, however, used a strict scrutiny test similar to equal protection
analysis. See notes 25 & 28 infra and accompanying text.

I1. FACTS
The Myers action was brought by an organization representing
indigent women throughout California. The dispute centered
around funding for abortions under the California Medi-Cal Program.4 Prior to 1978, the Medi-Cal program paid for legal abortions obtained by Medi-Cal recipients.5 The 1978-80 Budget Acts,6
however, limited such funding. In summary, these restrictions essentially provide funding for abortions only: "when pregnancy
would endanger the mother's life; when pregnancy would cause
severe and long lasting physical health damage to the mother;
when pregnancy is the result of illegal intercourse...

; or when

abortion is necessary to prevent the birth of severely defective infants."7 The plaintiffs contended that these Budget Acts violated
4. "The California Medi-Cal program funds 'physician, hospital or clinic outpatient, [and] surgical center' services, as well as 'inpatient hospital services,' for
'recipients of public assistance [and] medically indigent' aged and other persons."' 29 Cal. 3d at 258, 625 P.2d at 782, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869, citing, CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§ 14000 (West 1980) 14132(a) (b) (West Supp. 1981).
5. 29 Cal. 3d at 258, 625 P.2d at 782, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
6. Stats. 1978 ch. 359, § 2, item 298, pp. 823-825; Stats. 1979 ch. 259, § 2, item
261.5 pp. Stats. 1980, ch. 510, § 2, item 287.5, pp. . There were separate
challenges to each Budget Act of 1978 through 1980. The three were consolidated
upon appeal because each Act essentially provided for funding under the same
conditions, see note 4 supra.
7. 29 Cal. 3d at 259, 625 P.2d at 782, 869 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
The 1979 and 1980 Budget Acts restrict Medi-Cal abortion funding by
specifying that none of the funds appropriated for Medi-Cal shall be used
to pay for abortions, except under any of the following circumstances:
'(a) Where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to full term.
'(b) Where the pregnancy is ectopic.
'(c) Where the pregnancy results from an act punishable under Section
261 of the Penal Code, and such act has been reported, within 60 days, to a
law enforcement agency or a public health agency which has immediately
reported it to a law enforcement agency, and the abortion occurs during
the first trimester.
'(d) Where the pregnancy results from an act punishable under Section
261.5 of the Penal Code, and the female is under 18 years of age, and the
abortion is performed no later than the first trimester, provided the female's parent or guardian or, if none, an adult of the female's choice is notified at least five days prior to the abortion by the physician who
performs the abortion. Regulations governing the notice requirement
shall be promulgated by the State Director of Health Services.
'(e) Where the pregnancy results from an act punishable under Section
285 of the Penal Code, and such act has been reported to a law enforcement agency or a public health agency which has immediately reported it
to a law enforcement agency and the abortion occurs no later than during
the second trimester.
'(f) Where it is determined by prenatal studies limited to amniocentesis,
fetal blood sampling, fetal antiography, ultrasound, X-ray, or maternal
blood examination that the mother is likely to give birth to a child with a
major or severe genetic or congenital abnormality due to the presence of
chromosomal abnormalities, neural tube defects, biochemical diseases,
hemoglobinopathies, sex-linked diseases, and infectious processes.
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their constitutional guarantees of right to privacy, due process,
and equal protection.
The Myers court was quick to point out that the question before
them did not turn on the morality or immorality of abortions, nor
did it concern whether or not the state must subsidize poor people enabling them to exercise their constitutional rights. Rather,
the court stated that the issue was whether a state that has enacted a program to provide medical services to the poor, can discriminate by withholding benefits from otherwise qualified
individuals, because they exercise their constitutional right of
procreative choice in a manner not favored by the state.8
Distinguishing McRae, the court decided that the issue before it
turned on whether the controversial restrictions are compatible
with the California Constitution. McRae had already determined
that such restrictions are compatible with the federal Constitution; but the McRae Court does not address or resolve the issue of
whether such restrictions are compatible with the California
Constitution.9
In determining the constitutionality of the restrictions in controversy, the court noted that, through a series of cases spanning
three decades,1 0 it had developed a three-part test to evaluate
"funding schemes" that condition the receipt of benefits upon the
recipient's waiver of a constitutional right or upon the exercise of
such a right in a manner the government approves. This test requires the state to demonstrate that: the conditions imposed relate to the purpose of the legislation; the utility of the conditions
manifestly outweigh any impairment of constitutional rights; and
'(g) Where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the
mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term, when so certified under penalty of perjury by two physicians, one of whom, where practicable, is a specialist in the affected medical discipline, and
documentation thereof is provided with the claim for payment'.
The primary difference between the 1978 Act and the later acts is that
the 1978 Act provided funding for abortions to avoid severe and long-lasting physical health damage only when that damage arose from 10 enumerated medical conditions. Since the Legislature deleted that language in
the 1979 and 1980 enactments, the question of the validity of the 1978 language is moot.
29 Cal. 3d at 259 n.1, 625 P.2d at 782 n.1, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869 n.1, citing, Stats. 1979
ch. 259, § 2, item 261.5 pp. Stats. 1980, ch. 510, § 2, item 287.5 pp.
8. 29 Cal. 3d at 256-57, 625 P.2d at 780-81, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68.
9. 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
10. 29 Cal. 3d at 264, 625 P.2d at 785-86, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74. See note 25
infra.

there are no less offensive alternatives available for achieving the
state's objective."
II.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

The Myers decision is based on the two important premises 12
that California constitutional law is controlling and the restrictions in controversy must satisfy the three-part test established in
Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District.13
A.

FederalLaw Distinguished

Under the basic principles of federalism, the California Constitution is considered a document of independent force having independent responsibility for safeguarding the rights of California
citizens.14 The California Supreme Court has on numerous occasions found that the California Constitution provides greater protection than similar provisions in the United States
Constitution. 5 It is on this basis that the court distinguished Har11. Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District, 65 Cal. 2d 499, 505-07, 421
P.2d 409, 414-15, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406-07 (1966) (governmental agency's imposition
of restraints on the political activities of a public employee). See 29 Cal. 3d at 258,
625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868. See also note 23 supra.
12. Chief Justice Bird's concurring opinion disagreed with the second premise.
She argues that when any governmental action burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, the state must show a compelling state interest to justify its actions.
She believed the Bagley test to be an early attempt to formulate a standard for
close scrutiny when indirect burdens are placed on fundamental rights. Since the
Chief Justice believed that no distinction exists between direct and indirect burden scrutiny, she applied the traditional strict standard of compelling state interest. 29 Cal. 3d at 289-90 n.2, 625 P.2d at 801-02 n.2, 172 Cal Rptr. at 888-89 n.2.
The dissent disagrees with both premises. Justice Richardson, with Justice
Clark concurring, argues that the essential question is whether women have a
right to abortftee of charge and at taxpayer expense. 29 Cal. 3d at 298, 625 P.2d at
807, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 894 (emphasis in original). He concludes that federal law is
controlling and thus Harrisv. McRae should be followed.
13. 65 Cal. 2d at 505-07, 421 P.2d at 414-15, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07. See note 11
supra and accompanying text.
14. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-51, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112-14, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 328-30 (1975). The California Supreme Court, in interpreting the state
constitution, imposed higher standards upon law enforcement officers regarding
searches and seizures than the standards required by the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
15. As the Myers court noted, "we have on numerous occasions construed the
California Constitution as providing greater protection than that afforded by parallel provisions of the United States Constitution." 29 Cal. 3d at 261 n.4, 625 P.2d at
783-84 n.4, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71 n.4. See, e.g., People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231,
578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978) (protection against self-incrimination); People v. Hannon, 19 Cal. 3d 588, 564 P.2d 1203, 138 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1977) (right to
speedy trial); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976)
(equal protection); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1976) (protection against self-incrimination); People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943,
538 P.2d 75, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975) (search of arrestees); Curry v. Superior Court,
2 Cal. 3d 707, 470 P.2d 345, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) (double jeopardy); Cardenas v.
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ris v. McRae.

16

The Attorney General had argued that McRae, and hence, federal law is controlling. However, as the majority pointed out, McRae dealt only with the provisions of the federal Constitution; it
scheme
did not address the issue of whether such a funding
17
Constitution.
California
the
under
would be valid
In support of its conclusion that California law is controlling,
the court compared recent California and United States Supreme
Court decisions, which demonstrate the divergence between state
and federal law. For example, in Parrishv. Civil Service Commission,18 the California Supreme Court applied the Bagley test to
the State's practice of conditioning receipt of welfare benefits
upon the recipient's waiver of his constitutional right of privacy.
The Parrish court struck down the practice as unconstitutional. 19
However, in Wyman v. James,20 the United States Supreme Court
upheld similar practices under a lesser degree of scrutiny. In
Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District,21 the California
Supreme Court held invalid a public advertising policy allowing
commercial expression but disallowing non-commercial, political
expression, since such action could not survive scrutiny under the
Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1961) (same); People
v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955) (vicarious exclusionary rule).
16. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See note 2 supra.
17. 29 Cal. 3d at 260, 625 P.2d at 783, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
18. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967). The Parrish case involved a social worker discharged for insubordination because she declined to participate in a mass morning raid upon the homes of Welfare recipients. The court
held that the county's failure to secure legally effective consent to search rendered
the raids unconstitutional. Further, even if consent had been obtained, the county
could not condition receipt of benefits upon the giving of such consent. Because of
the unconstitutionality of the raids, the social worker possessed adequate grounds
for declining to participate.
19. 29 Cal. 3d at 266, 625 P.2d at 787, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
20. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). In Wyman, a recipient of public assistance refused to
permit a caseworker to visit her home. Pursuant to her refusal, benefits were terminated. The United States Supreme Court held that such visits were not unreasonable since they served a valid administrative purpose and no right guaranteed
under the fourth amendment was violated. 29 Cal. 3d at, 266, 625 P.2d at 787, 172
Cal. Rptr. at 874.
21. 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967). Wirta involved an organization called Women for Peace who attempted to place an advertisement on district operated buses requesting individuals to write to the president asking him to
end the Vietnam War. The district refused, contending such advertisement conflicted with their policy of accepting commercial advertisement for the sale of
goods only. The court found this to be protected speech and any discrimination
violated the first amendment. See 29 Cal. 3d at 266, 625 P.2d at 787, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
874.

Bagley test. In contrast, the United States Supreme Court in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 22 upheld similar advertising policies. In Bagley 23 the California Supreme Court found limitations
on the political activities of public employees to be unconstitutional; whereas in United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National
Association of Letter Carriers24 the United States Supreme Court
upheld similar restrictions on the activities of federal employees.
In addition to distinguishing the applicability of federal law, the
court distinguished between the factors used to scrutinize the
discriminating schemes under federal and California law. For example, in McRae, the federal approach to the constitutionality of
funding restrictions focuses on whether additional obstacles are
placed in "the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of
choice." 25 The Myers court, however, noted that such an approach does not correspond to the California standard; and therefore has no bearing on applying California law.26 Specifically,
California law pursuant to the Bagley decision 27 requires that
"whenever the state conditions the receipt of a benefit upon a
waiver of a constitutional right or discriminatorily withholds such
a benefit from individuals who exercise such right, the state must
22. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Lehman involved a political candidate who attempted
to purchase advertising on the rapid transit system owned by the city. The city
refused his request because of its policy of not permitting political advertising.
See 29 Cal. 3d at 266, 625 P.2d at 787, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
23. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401(1966). See note 11 supra. In
Bagley, a hospital employee refused to discontinue her participation in a campaign to recall certain members of the Board of Directors. Her activities involved
circulating recall petitions and distributing literature which were confined to her
off-duty hours. The Board dismissed her pursuant to a government code section
prohibiting public employees from taking an active part in political campaigns.
The California Supreme Court struck down the statute as overbroad. See Danskin
V.San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 CaL 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946); see also notes
29 & 30 infra & accompanying text.
24. 413 U.S. 548 (1973). The constitutionality of the provisions of the Hatch Act
(5 U.S.C. § 7324 (a) (2)) forbidding federal employees to "take an active part in
political management or in political campaigns" was upheld by the Supreme
Court. The court specifically held that these provisions were not vague and
overbroad.
25. 29 Cal. 3d at 267, 625 P.2d at 787, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (Myers court quoting
the McRae decision).
The California courts ...

have acknowledged both the practical impor-

tance of many governmental benefits to individual recipients and the corresponding likelihood that a discriminatory benefit program will
effectively nullify important constitutional rights. Thus, California holdings uniformly confirm that the absence of an "additional obstacle" to the
exercise of one's constitutional rights does not eliminate the government's
burden of demonstrating the propriety of the condition or limitation under
the Bagley test.
Id. at 268, 625 P.2d at 788, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
26. Id.
27. Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist., 65 Cal. 3d 499, 421 P.2d 409,
55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
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demonstrate the propriety of the condition in terms of the gov28
erning three-part test."
B.

The Bagley Test

The three-part Bagley test establishes the standard of scrutiny
to be used in determining the constitutionality of certain limitations or restrictions imposed on an individual's constitutional
rights. The test does not apply to situations in which the state
has no obligation to provide benefits, but rather applies to the situation in which the state has decided to make such benefits available, but withholds the benefits from qualified individuals solely
because they choose to exercise a constitutional right.
In Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District,2 9 the foundation for the Bagley test was established. In Danskin the state had
established a program that allowed private organizations to use
public school buildings for public meetings, but excluded other
nonfavored groups from using the same facilities. The court held:
The state is under no duty to make school buildings available for public
meetings.... If it elects to do so, however, it cannot arbitrarily prevent
any members of the public from holding such meetings. Nor can it make
the privilege of holding them dependent on conditions that
30 would deprive
any members of the public of their constitutional rights.

In Myers, the Attorney General argued that because the state is
not obligated to provide benefits in controversy, it may exclude
certain recipients solely because they seek to exercise a constitutional right.3 ' However, since Danskin, the California courts have
repeatedly rejected such an argument.3 2
28. 29 Cal. 3d at 269, 625 P.2d at 788, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
29. 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
30. Id. at 545-46, 171 P.2d at 891.
31. Id. at 263, 625 P.2d at 784-85, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72, where the court sums
up the Attorney General's argument as follows:
[TJhe state violates no constitutional precept when it does not directly
prohibit the protected activity but simply declines to extend a public benefit-in this case publicly funded medical care--to those who choose to exercise their constitutional right in a manner the state does not approve
and does not wish to subsidize.
Id.
32. The California courts have "applied the legal principles underlying the
Danskin decision in a wide variety of factual settings, involving a host of different
'public benefit' programs which conditioned the receipt of benefits on the waiver
or forfeiture of a broad range of constitutional rights." Id at 264, 625 P.2d at 785,
172 Cal. Rptr. at 872. See, e.g., City of Carmel-By-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259,
466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (public benefit program at issue was access to
public employment); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, 68 Cal. 2d 51,

The Bagley decision itself involved a nurse's aide who was discharged pursuant to former Government Code Section 320533
when she refused to continue her off duty pamphleting and petition circulation activities. The court struck down the statute as
unconstitutional and established the three-part test that the state
34
must satisfy in order to justify such a scheme.
434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967) (public benefit program at issue was access to
a public forum); Parrish v. Civil Service Commission of the County of Alameda, 61
Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964) (public benefit program at issue
was access to welfare benefits); Binet-Montessori, Inc. v. San Francisco Unified
School District, 98 Cal. App. 3d 991, 160 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1979) (public benefit program
at issue was access to public property); Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority, 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (public benefit program at issue
was access to public housing); Thornton v. Dept. of Human Resource Development, 32 Cal. App. 3d 180, 107 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1973) (public benefit program at issue
was access to unemployment benefits).
The court points out that this does not mean that the government may never
condition benefits on the nonassertion of constitutional rights, but rather, as
stated in Bagley: "Just as we have rejected the fallacious argument that the
power of government to impose such conditions know no limit, so must we acknowledge that government may, when circumstancesinexorably so require, impose conditions upon the enjoyment of publicly conferred benefits despite a
resulting qualification of constitutional rights." 29 Cal. 3d at 264 n.15, 625 P.2d at
786 n.15, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873 n.15 (emphasis in original).
33. Former CAL. GOvT. CODE § 3205 which related to participation by civil servants in political campaigns, was repealed by statute in 1976. Former Government
Code section 3205 provides: "No ...

employee ...

of a local agency shall take an

active part in any campaign ... for or against any ballot measure relating to the
recall of any elected official of the local agency."
34. 65 Cal. 2d at 505-07, 421 P.2d at 414-15, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07.
The court expressed the three-part test that the state must satisfy as follows:
[The state] must establish that the imposed conditions relate to the
purpose of the legislation which confers the benefit or privilege..
Not only must the conditions annexed to the enjoyment of a publiclyconferred benefit reasonably tend to further the purpose sought by conferment of that benefit, but also the utility of imposing the conditions must
manifestly outweigh any resulting impairment of constitutional rights
[I n imposing conditions upon the enjoyment of publicly-conferred benefits,. . . the state must establish the unavailability of less offensive alternatives, and demonstrate that the conditions are drawn with narrow
specificity, restricting the exercise of constitutional rights only to the extent necessary to maintain the integrity of the program which confers the
benefits.
Id. The court stated that it drew upon prior holdings and scholarly legal commentaries to develop this test, see note 25 supra. The commentaries include O'Neil,
Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits With Strings Attached 54 CAT_ L
REV. 443 (1966); Linde, ConstitutionalRights in the Public Sector 40 WASH. L. REV.
10 (1965); Note, UnconstitutionalConditions 73 HAxv. L. REV. 1595 (1960); Willcox,
Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned Public Spending 41 CoRNELL L. Q. 12 (1955); Hale, UnconstitutionalConditions and ConstitutionalRights
35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Powell, The Right to Work for the State 16 COLuM. L.
REV. 99 (1916).

California Supreme Court Survey

[Vol. 9: 233, 1981]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

I.

CASE ANALYSIS

The court analyzed the facts in Myers to determine whether the
state could meet the three-part constitutional standard test established in Bagley:
A.

Do the Conditions Imposed Relate to the Purpose of the
Legislation?

The first part of this test requires the state to "establish that
the imposed conditions relate to the purposes of the legislation
which confers the benefit or privilege." 35 The purpose of the
Medi-Cal program is set forth in the California Welfare and Institutions Code which states: "The purpose [of the Medi-Cal program] is to afford health care and related remedial or preventive
services to recipients of public assistance and to medically indi"36 Therefore, in order to meet
gent aged and other persons ....
the first part of this test, the State must establish that the restrictions imposed help "alleviate the hardship and suffering incurred
by those who cannot afford needed medical care by enabling
them to obtain such medical treatment." 37 Because the restrictions allow funding for abortions only in very limited circum35. 65 Cal. 2d at 505-06, 421 P.2d at 414, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406. As previously noted
in this case analysis, an important requirement for applying the Bagley test is that
some benefit or privilege be conferred. The Bagley court elaborated on this requirement by quoting a portion of Justice Frankfurter's concurring and dissenting
opinion in American Communications Ass'n v. Doads, 339 U.S. 382, 417 (1950):
"Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities for a better life, but if it affords them
it cannot make them available in an obviously arbitrary way or exact surrender of
freedoms unrelated to the purpose of the facilities." 65 Cal. 2d at 506, 421 P.2d at
414, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
The Myers court also noted that in most of the California public benefit cases,
the restriction had at least some relation to the purpose of the program. In Bagley, (see note 19 supra), the restrictions were on first amendment activities by
those who obtained the benefit of public employment. The restrictions were apparently intended to curtail those activities thought to interfere with effective performance of the public employee's job. In Parrish (see note 15 supra), the
restrictions related to the elimination of fraud in the welfare system.
36. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 14000 (West 1980).
37. 29 Cal. 3d at 271-72, 625 P.2d at 790, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877. The court compares the denial of benefits in this case with a California case decided over 25
years ago: Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 883, 279 P.2d 213
(1955). In Cordova, the Los Angeles Housing Authority had a policy of excluding
so-called subversives from public supported low rent housing projects. The Cordova court found the exclusionary policy unconstitutional: "The purpose of the
[housing act] is to eradicate slums and provide housing for persons of low-income
It is evident that the exclusion of otherwise qualified persons solely
class ....
because of membership in organizations designated as subversive by the Attorney

stances, the court held that these restrictions "directly impede
this fundamental purpose." 38
The court noted that the only way the State can show a relationship between the Budget Act limitations and the purpose of
the Medi-Cal program is by claiming that Medi-Cal seeks to protect the life and health of the fetus. 39 However, as discussed in
the second part of the test, such an objective "impermissibly denigrates the woman's right to choice." 40 "Both California and federal authorities establish that, at least prior to viability, the state
may not subordinate a woman's own medical interests or her
right of procreative choice to the interests of the fetus."4 1 The
court then turned to the second part of the Bagley test.
B. Balancing the Utility of Imposing Restrictions againstthe
Resulting Impairment of ConstitutionalRights
The second part of the Bagley test requires the State to demonstrate that the "utility of imposing the conditions ... manifestly
outweigh[s] any resulting impairment of constitutional rights."42
The court began by examining the nature and importance of the
constitutional rights at issue. 43 Both the right to life and the right
General has no tendency whatever to further such purpose." 130 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. at 888, 279 P.2d at 218.
38. 29 Cal. 3d at 272, 625 P.2d at 790, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877. The court notes that
even if an abortion represents the appropriate medical treatment, the statute virtually barred payment and thus subjected the woman to significant health
hazards, and in some cases death. Id. See 29 Cal. 3d at 272 n.21, 625 P.2d at 790-91
n.21, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877.78 n.21, where the court makes reference to an extensive
factual hearing by the trial court in McRae and sets out certain hazards to the
health of indigent women presented by the California Budget Act limitations.
39. Id. at 273, 625 P.2d at 791, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 65 Cal. 2d at 506, 421 P.2d at 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 407. In undertaking this
analysis, the court notes that it
must realistically assess the importance of the state interest served by the
restrictions and the degree to which the restrictions actually serve such
interest; further [it] must carefully evaluate the importance of the constitutional right at stake and gauge the extent to which the individual's ability to exercise that right is threatened or impaired, as a practical matter,
by the specific statutory restrictions or conditions at issue.
29 Cal. 3d at 273-74, 625 P.2d at 791-92, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79.
43. This approach was derived from cases subsequent to Bagley. See, e.g.,
City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 265-72, 446 P.2d 225, 229-35, 85
Cal. Rptr. 1, 5-11 (1970) (a financial disclosure law required every public officer and
each candidate for state or local office to file a statement as to the nature and extent of investments in excess of $10,000); Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 Cal.
2d 260, 270-74, 425 P.2d 223, 230-32, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 630-32 (1967) (social worker discharged for insubordination for declining to participate in raid of welfare recipients' homes); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Education, 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 199-
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of procreative choice were recognized. 44 With respect to the right
to life, the court noted that childbirth and abortion involve a potential risk to the pregnant woman's life and the preservation of
her personal health.45 With respect to the woman's right of procreative choice, 46 the court, citing People v. Belous,47 stated that
the restrictions at issue undermine the right of privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution 48 in addition to her right of
procreative choice. 4 9 The court concluded that these rights are
202, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520, 527-29 (1967) (tenured teacher transferred to home teaching
because he insisted on wearing a beard). See also note 16 supra.
For a discussion of this balancing process in general, See O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L REV. 443
(1966); Comment, Another Look at UnconstitutionalConditions, 117 U. PA. L REV.
144 (1968).
44. "The rights involved ... are the woman's rights to life and to choose
whether to bear children." People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80
Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969).
45. "In California, law and medicine recognize that therapeutic abortion is a
legitimate medical treatment which may be necessary for the preservation of a
pregnant woman's life and health." Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 879, 484 P.2d
1345, 1349, 95 Cal. Rptr 1, 5 (1971).
46. The court also cites Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 15-10 at 924
(1977), for the proposition that the constitutional right of procreation choice is essential for a woman's ability to retain personal control over her body:
If a man is the involuntary source of a child-if he is forbidden, for example, to practice contraception-the violation of his personality is profound;
the decision that one want to engage in sexual intercourse but does not
want to parent another human being may reflect the deepest of personal
convictions. But if a woman is forced to bear a child-not simply to provide an ovum, but to carry the child to term--the invasion is incalculably
greater ....
[Ilt is difficult to imagine a clearer case of bodily intrusion,
even if the original conception was in some sense voluntary.
29 Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
47. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969). In Belous, a doctor gave
out the phone number of another doctor who performed abortions in Tijuana to a
heavily distraught couple threatening to have an abortion one way or another.
The doctor was arrested pursuant to former California Penal Code Section 274
which provided for imprisonment for anyone helping to procure the miscarriage of
a woman unless necessary to preserve her life. The court held that the statute
could not withstand the constitutional challenge of vagueness.
48. Cal. Const., art. 1, § 1.
49. "The fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear children
follows from the Supreme Court's and this court's repeated acknowledgement of a
'right of privacy' or 'liberty' in matters related to marriage, family and sex." 71 Cal.
2d at 963, 458 P.2d at 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
"[I1f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual... to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (original italics).
The Myers court also states that "Itihis right of personal choice is central to a
woman's control not only of her own body, but also to the control of her social role

"clearly among the most intimate and fundamental of all constitutional rights."5 0
The extent to which the limitations in controversy would impair
these aforementioned rights was then examined. Various factors
inherent in the program itself were cited to support the finding
that the actual'impairment was severe. 5 1 Since medical expenses
under the Medi-Cal program are available only to the poor, the
only women affected are those who lack the ability to pay for an
abortion on their own.5 2 In this respect, the state is utilizing its
right of procrearesources to force these women to exercise their
53
tive choice in a manner approved by the state.
Comparing prior California case law, the court noted that the
present restrictions were significantly greater than those previously imposed and invalidated. In Danskin,5 4 even though the restrictions imposed denied disfavored persons the use of public
school buildings, it did not preclude them from holding meetings
or disseminating their views to the public. 55 In Bagley, 56 the limitations restricted the public employees' free speech rights but did
not preclude the individual from engaging in all political
activity.5 7
Three interests are identified by the court as possible benefits
which the state might derive from the restrictions in controversy:
(1) conserving state expenditures; (2) encouraging childbirth and
(3) protecting the potential life of the fetus. Under the Bagley
test, these interests must manifestly outweigh the individual's
5 8 With respect to conserving
rights and the impairment thereof.L
state expenditures, the court noted that "whatever money is
and personal destiny." 29 Cal. 3d at 275, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (citing
Karst, The Supreme Cou% 1976 Terr." Toward Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L REV. 1, 57-58 (1977)).
50. 29 Cal. 3d at 275, 625 P.2d at 793, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
51. Id. at 275-76, 625 P.2d at 793, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880. The court noted that the
limited availability of financing abortions through private charities is exemplified
by the Medi-Cal program itself.
52. Id. at 275-76, 625 P.2d at 793, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
53. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion in McRae, had similar objections: "By funding all of the expenses associated with childbirth and none of the
expenses incurred in terminating pregnancy, the Government literally makes an
offer that the indigent woman cannot afford to refuse." 448 U.S. at 333-34.
54. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
55. 29 Cal. 3d at 276, 625 P.2d at 793, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
56. See notes 11 and 36 supra.
57. 29 Cal. 3d at 27, 625 P.2d at 79, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
58. The court recognized that "only the most compelling of state interests
could satisfy this test." 29 Cal. 3d at 276, 625 P.2d at 793, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880. The
court pointed out that this analysis clearly parallels the judicial scrutiny used to
determine whether an enactment denies equal protection of the law. Since the
court believed that no compelling state interest exists, the restrictions in controversy also violate equal protection principles. Because of the similarity of princi-
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saved by refusing to fund abortions will be spent many times over
in paying maternity care and childbirth expenses and supporting
the children of indigent mothers."5 9 Concerning the interest of
encouraging childbirth, the court noted that the "California Legislature has not embraced a general policy of encouraging unwanted children"6 0 since under the present provisions funds are
authorized to pay for medical expenses for contraception and
sterilization. 6 1 As for the third state interest of protecting the potential life of the fetus, the court believed this to be a legitimate
interest underlying the funding restrictions in controversy. It recognized, however, that this interest contravenes the woman's
right of procreative choice. 62 An important distinction was made
by the court on this issue. It noted that a similar argument was
63
advanced by the State of Texas in Roe v. Wade.
In Roe, the Supreme Court distinguished between the State's
interest in a viable versus a nonviable fetus, 64 by holding that
prior to the third trimester the state may regulate only to protect
the woman's health-not to protect the fetus. 65 The Myers court
found that the Budget Act limitations fail to make this distinction;
the limitations subordinate the woman's right of procreative
choice to the lesser state interest of protecting a nonviable fetus. 66 In addition, the court noted that California decisions do not
ples, however, the court saw no need to undertake a separate analysis of equal
protection defects. Id. at 276 n.22, 625 P.2d at 793 n.22, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.22.
59. 29 Cal. 3d at 277, 625 P.2d at 794, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881. The court also cites
Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980), a companion case to McRae, where it was
estimated that similar restrictions would impose an additional cost of $20,000,000
per year. In addition, the trial court in Zbaraz found the average cost of an abortion to be less than $150.00 while the average cost of childbirth exceeded $1,350.00.
29 Cal. 3d at 277 n.23, 25, 625 P.2d at 794 n.23, 25, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881, 23, 25.
60. 29 Cal. 3d at 278, 625 P.2d at 795, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (emphasis in original).
61. Id.
62. "[T]he state is not merely proposing to protect a fetus from general harm,
but rather is asserting an interest in protecing a fetus vis-a-vis the woman to
whom the fetus is an integral part. Such a claimed interest, of course, clashes
head-on with the woman's own fundamental right of procreative choice." Id. at
279, 625 P.2d at 795, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The State of Texas argued that its asserted interest in
protecting the fetus justified criminal proscriptions on abortion.
64. During the first two trimesters the state has no compelling interest in protecting the fetus. Therefore, prior to the third trimester, the state may regulate
only to protect the woman's health. Only in the third trimester may the state enact restrictions to protect the fetus. 410 U.S. at 164-65.
65. Id.
66. 'The Budget Act seeks to limit first and second trimester abortions, not for
the permissible purpose of protecting the woman's health, but to protect the fetus

support the State's contention of an interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. This interest was asserted in Belous,67
where the court held that this interest was derived from statutes
and rules that "required a live birth or reflect the interest of the
parents." 68 Further support was found in the amendment to the
California Constitution providing explicit protection for the right
of privacy. 69 The right of procreative choice is an aspect of the
right of privacy and, under the California Constitution, is at least
as broad as that described in Roe v. Wade.70 Therefore, the
State's interest in protecting the fetus is subordinate to the wo71
man's right of privacy.
From the foregoing analysis, the court concluded that the alleged benefits do not manifestly outweigh the resulting impairment of constitutional rights. The state had therefore failed to
meet the second part of the Bagley test.
C. Less Offensive Alternativesfor Achieving the State's
Objective
The third and final part of the Bagley test requires the State to
adopt the least offensive alternative to achieve a legitimate state
interest.72 The court noted that if the Budget Act restrictions are
intended to prevent indigent women from obtaining abortions,
this third part failed because "the state's interest in protecting
....
In short, Roe v. Wade settled that protection of a nonviable fetus is not a
compelling state interest." 29 Cal. 3d at 279-80, 625 P.2d at 795-96, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
882-83. The court continues by noting that McRae did not detract from that holding. Rather, the McRae holding was based on the court's finding that no new obstacle to abortion was imposed. 'That proposition, as we have explained, is
inconsistent with California constitutional law." Id. at 280, 625 P.2d at 796, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 883.
67. See note 47 supra.
68. 71 Cal. 2d at 967-68, 458 P.2d at 202, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
69. See note 48 supra.
70. The court cites City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d
436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980), wherein the court discusses the breadth of the federal right of privacy, concluding that it appears to be narrower than the right to
privacy under the California Constitution. Id. at 130 n.3, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3.
71. 29 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 625 P.2d at 796, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 883. In addition, the
court found that even if the state could assert a compelling interest, it doubted
whether these restrictions could pass equal protection scrutiny since the state has
not undertaken to protect all fetuses by promoting their interest over the constitutional rights of all women. Id. at 281, 625 P.2d at 796, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 883. See note
58 supra. The court also notes that it has been more critical of restrictions on the

constitutional rights of the poor than it has been on the rest of society. Id. (citing
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) and In re
Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
72. The court notes that this requirement also parallels judicial scrutiny under
equal protection principles. 29 Cal. 3d at 282 n.28, 625 P.2d at 797 n.28, 172 Cal. Rptr.
at 884 n.28. See also note 18 supra.
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the fetus cannot be pursued by subordinating the woman's right
of procreative choice. ' 73 The Attorney General, in an effort to
avoid this result, had asserted that the restrictions are an effort to
aid poor women who have already decided to bear a child but
cannot afford the expenses of childbirth.74 This argument was
summarily dismissed by the court "since the state could readily
meet the needs of indigent women without burdening their right
of procreative choice simply by funding impartially the expenses
of childbirth and abortion."75 The court therefore, found that the
third part of the test had also not been satisfied.
IV.

IMPACT

The Myers decision precludes the State from restricting MediCal funding for abortions unless it can do so with respect to all
women and all fetuses, 76 and can demonstrate a compelling state
interest for its action. 77 The decision itself is limited to Medi-Cal
funding; however, the rationale can be extended to any attempted
restriction on abortion. Since the right of procreative choice is a
fundamental right under the California Constitution, 78 the State
may only restrict this right by demonstrating a compelling state
interest. 79 In addition, the court adopted the Roe v. Wade rationale that, prior to the third trimester, the state's interest in protecting the fetus is subordinate to the woman's right of privacy.80
Prior to the third trimester the State may only regulate to protect
the woman's health. Thus, if the State's interest is to protect the
73. 29 Cal. 3d at 283, 625 P.2d at 797, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884. The court is merely
noting that such a purpose would not survive the second part of the Bagley test.
74. Id.
75. Id. In addition, the court contended that the legislative background of the
statute belies the Attorney General's suggestion because no additional aid is provided for those who choose to have a child, but rather curtails the funds previously available to those who decide to have an abortion. Id. at 283, 625 P.2d at 798,
172 Cal. Rptr. at 885. The court cites The Pregnancy Freedom of Choice Act, CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 16145 et seq (West 1980) for an example of a program
designed to aid indigent women who choose to bear children without infringing
upon the rights of those who choose abortion. Id. at 283 n.29, 625 P.2d at 797-98
n.29, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85 n.29.
76. See note 72 supra.
77. See note 58 supra.
78. See notes 42 and 49 supra.
79. "[A] woman's right to choose may be infringed only by regulations necessary to further a compelling interest." 29 Cal. 3d at 280, 625 P.2d at 796, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 883, citing People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354
(1969).
80. See notes 61-66 supra and accompanying text.

fetus, it can place restrictions on abortion only during the third
trimester.8 1
Myers reaffirms that whenever the state undertakes to provide
benefits to the public, the three-part Bagley test will be used to
scrutinize any action by the state that attempts to withhold those
benefits from an otherwise qualified individual solely because the
individual chooses to exercise a constitutionally protected right.
As the court noted, such action may be subject to equal protection scrutiny as well. 82
The Myers decision will affect countless numbers of pregnant
women on Medi-Cal, who would otherwise be forced to choose between having the child or, if possible, finding another source of
funding. An alternative holding would have undoubtedly had a
83
marked social, as well as economic, impact.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Myers decision is easily distinguishable from McRae. Each
decision is based upon divergent premises. McRae was decided
under the federal constitution. Myers was based on the guarantees of the California Constitution, which have consistently afforded greater protection to California citizens. Secondly, McRae
used a minimum scrutiny test; the court merely looked to see
whether any new obstacle to abortion was imposed. Myers, however, employed the strict scrutiny Bagley test, which is similar to
an equal protection analysis. Myers is best viewed as the latest in
a series of cases exemplifying the California Supreme Court's adherence to guaranteeing the highest degree of constitutional protection to its citizens.

B.

ARTICLE VII, SECTION

1, 2, & 3.

1. The Constitutionalityof the State-Employee Relations
Act of 1977: Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown
The California Supreme Court case of Pacific Legal Foundation
v. Brouml involved a constitutional challenge to the State Employer-Employee Relations Act (SEERA) of 1977.2 The challenge
centered on whether the SEERA confers certain powers on the
legislature that are specifically reserved in the California Consti81. Id.
82. See note 58 supra.
83. See notes 49 and 59 supra.
1. 29 Cal. 3d 168, 624 P.2d 1215, 172 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1981).

2. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3512-24 (West 1980).
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tution for the State Personnel Board.3 Specifically, the issues addressed in the action were: first, whether SEERA would conflict
with the merit principle prescribed in Article VII of the California
Constitution; 4 second, whether SEERA controvenes Article VII by
allowing the legislature and the Governor to fix salaries, rather
than allowing the State Personnel Board to do so;5 third, whether
provisions of SEERA granting the Public Employees Relations
Board (PERB) jurisdiction to investigate and devise remedies for
unfair practices are contrary to the jurisdiction granted the State
Personnel Board under Article VII;6 and, last, the petitioner's contention that under SEERA, there was an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority and an infringement of the gubernatorial veto
7
power.

The court began its analysis by providing a history of the acts
leading up to the SEERA provisions and a general policy discussion regarding the need for continuing legislation in the area of
employer-employee relations. 8 The court carefully outlined the
3. Certain powers are reserved for the State Personnel Board. CAL. CONST.

art. VII, §§ 1, 2 &3. The pertinent portion of section one states: "(a) the civil service includes every officer and employee of the state except as otherwise provided
in this Constitution. (b) In the civil service permanent appointment and promotion shall be made under a general system based on merit ascertained by competitive examination." Section two states:
(a) there is a Personnel Board of 5 members appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, a majority of membership concurring, for
a 10-year term and until their successors are appointed and qualified ....
(c) The Board shall appoint and prescribe compensation for an executive officer
who shall be a member of the civil service but not a member of the board.
Section three states that, "(a) the board shall enforce the civil service statutes
and, by a majority vote of all its members, shall prescribe probationary periods
and classifications, adopt other rules authorized by statute, and review disciplinary actions. (b) The executive officer shall adminster the civil service statutes
under rules of the board."
4. 29 Cal. 3d at 174, 624 P.2d at 1217, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 489. See CAL CONST. art.
VII, § l(b).
5. 29 Cal. 3d at 174, 624 P.2d at 1218, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 490. See CAL. CONST. art.
VII, § 3(a).
6. 29 Cal. 3d at 175, 624 P.2d at 1218, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 490. See CAL. CONST. art

VII, § 3(a).
7. 29 Cal. 3d at 506, 624 P.2d at 1234, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
8. For several reasons the court concluded that SEERA modifies the George
Brown Act, see CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3525-36 (West 1980), by strengthening the role
of employees. First, SEERA provides exclusive representation on matters of employment relations by employee organizations, whose members are elected by a
majority of employees in designated bargaining units. Second, the SEERA requires that the Governor and employee representatives meet in good faith. Finally, any agreements reached must be reduced to "a written memorandum of
understanding." 29 Cal. 3d at 177-78, 624 P.2d at 1220, 172 Cal. Rptr at 492.

rationale and the legislative intent of SEERA and noted that the
legislative intent was significant in upholding the constitutionality
of SEERA.9
The petitioners' arguments' 0 centered on the conflict between
SEERA and Article VII. The first argument was rejected because
the expressed "sole aim" of the original ballot argument accompanying the Act was to follow the constitutional mandate of Article
VII." This intent to follow the constitutional mandate was particularly evident in the preamble to SEERA.12 The petitioners' second argument was dismissed as groundless because the court
found that Article VII did not, and has never, assigned the responsibility of salary fixing to the State Personnel Board. Instead, the court found that the Board -could proscribe
classifications of jobs, but that this function did not encompass
actual salary fixing.' 3 The court relied upon numerous California
cases for the premise that it has always been a legitimate function to fix salaries. 14
The petitioner's third argument was centered on a challenge to
the SEERA constitutionality, focusing on a proposed jurisdictional conflict with the PERB.I5 The court, however, stated that,
in many areas, there was no overlap with the State Personnel
9. 29 Cal. 3d at 202, 624 P.2d at 1235, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
10. See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text.
11. The ballot argument stated that "Itihe purpose of this constitutional
amendment is to promote efficiency and economy in State government. The sole
aim of the act is to prohibit appointments and promotion in State service except
on the basis of merit, efficiency and fitness ascertained by competitive examination." 29 Cal. 3d at 182, 624 P.2d at 1222, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
12. California Government Code section 3512 states that "[n]othing in this
chapter shall be construed to controvene the spirit or intent of the merit principle
in state employment, nor to limit the entitlements of state civil services employees,. . . provided by Article VII of the California Constitution or by laws or rules
enacted pursuant thereto." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3512 (West 1980).
13. 29 Cal. 3d at 186-96 624 P.2d at 1225-31, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 497-503.
14. See State Trial Attorneys Ass'n v. State, 63 Cal. App. 3d 298, 303, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 712, 715 (1976); California State Employees' Ass'n v. State, 32 Cal. App. 3d
103, 107-08, 108 Cal. Rptr. 60, 63-64 (1973); Procter v. S.F. Port Authority, 266 Cal.
App., 2d 675, 72 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1968); Raymond v. Christen, 24 Cal. App. 2d 92, 74
P.2d 536 (1937).
The one case cited by the petitioners in support of their position was specifically
disapproved. 29 Cal. 3d at 192, 624 P.2d at 1229, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 501. The decision
relied upon by the petitioners, Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. State Personnel
Bd., 77 Cal. App. 3d 52, 143 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1978), did contain language that would
allow the State Personnel Board to fix salaries. This case was disapproved to the
extent it conferred such authority, for their "power does not include the power to
set salaries." 29 Cal. 3d at 192, 624 P.2d at 1229, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
15. Specifically, the petitioners argued "that the provisions of SEERA granting
PERB jurisdiction to investigate and devise remedies for unfair practices are irreconcilably in conflict with the State Personnel Board's jurisdiction to 'review
disciplinary actions' under article VII, section 3, subdivision (a)" of the California
Constitution. 29 Cal. 3d at 196, 624 P.2d at 1231, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
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Board's "disciplinary action" jurisdiction, and, even in those areas
where there may be an overlap, rules of construction are sufficient to resolve the matter and would prevail. 16 The court expressed the view that harmony, not conflict, was expected
between the separate authorities. Numerous analogies and examples were used by the court to show a growing pattern of harmonizing principles in dealing with overlapping jurisdictions. 17
The petitioners' final argument was summarily dismissed as being without merit because nothing in the SEERA would, in any
way, controvene the precept of the gubernatorial veto power.18
The court distinguished the type of areas to be dealt with by the
SEERA from areas calling for fundamental policy considerations
and found that there had been no wrongful delegation of power.1 9
In conclusion, the court upheld every challenged aspect of the
SEERA and made clear that the intent behind the legislative enactment was a deciding factor in its decision.20
VIII. REAL PROPERTY LAW
A. Boundary Designation
1. Designation of Property Lines of Real
Property Adjoining Navigable Nontidal Waters: California v. Superior Court of
Lake County
In Californiav. SuperiorCourt of Lake County,' the court clari16. 29 Cal. 3d at 196-97, 624 P.2d at 1232, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
17. For example, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission is afforded
authority analogous to that authority afforded to PERB. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 12960-70 (West 1980). See, e.g., Kaplan's Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court,
26 Cal. 3d 60, 603 P.2d 1341, 160 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979); San Diego Teachers Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 593 P.2d 838, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1979); Vargus v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal. 3d 902, 587 P.2d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1978).
18. 29 Cal. 3d at 201-02, 624 P.2d at 1234-35, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
19. Id. The court asserted that SEERA is concerned with matters regarding
the "details of the wages, hours and working conditions of employees covered by
the act," not with the deciding of fundamental policy questions. Id. at 201, 624 P.2d
at 1234, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
20. Justice Richardson authored a dissenting opinion in the case, stating that
SEERA "is plainly unconstitutional as a gross infringement upon the powers of
the State Personnel Board ...

"

29 Cal. 3d at 203, 624 P.2d at 1235, 172 Cal. Rptr.

at 507.
1. 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981). In this case, Lyon, the
real party in interest, owned 800 acres along the shore of Clear Lake, 500 acres of
which was known as Anderson Marsh. The water level of the marsh fluctuates

fled an ambiguous area of California water law by declaring that
the owners of land along the shoreline of navigable, nontidal waters at one time had title to that land between the low and high
water marks, but that such title was held subject to a public trust.
The dispute between the parties in this case centered on the interpretation of the confusing history of California case law. Lyon,
owner of the marshland in question, asserted that the State had
never acquired title to the beds underlying navigable, nontidal
waters above the low water mark because, upon admission to the
Union, it had adopted English common law, which held that the
sovereign could make no claim to lands underlying nontidal waters. 2 Consequently, Lyon argued, when the state enacted section
830 of the California Civil Code in 1872, it determined to claim
only that land underlying nontidal navigable water to the low
water mark.3
In a cross-claim ified by the State, it was asserted that title to
the high water mark of the marshlands was acquired by virtue of
the State's sovereignty. The State further contended that section
830 of the Civil Code only set forth a rule of construction for
deeds and did not lay down a rule of property law.
The California Supreme Court noted that although the State
had adopted the common law of England upon its admission to
the Union, it did not require courts to adhere to the English rules
seasonally. Lyon, who wished to develop the property, sought a permit to repair a
levee which would reclaim the marshland. The California Fish and Game Commission notified Lyon that his application could not be processed since the State
claimed ownership of the marsh to the low water mark. When Lyon filed suit to
quiet title and for declaratory relief, the State cross-claimed. The trial court held
that no portion of the marsh above the low water mark was state property, but
that the waters between the low and high water marks were subject to a public
servitude or trust. This ruling has considerable importance in California, since it
affects more than 4,000 miles of shoreline along thirty four navigable lakes and
thirty one navigable streams.
2. In English common law, there were clear rules of ownership regarding the
beds of tidal and nontidal waters. Only tidal waters were considered navigable
while nontidal lakes and streams were privately owned, with ownership extending
to the middle of the lake or stream. The beds of navigable waters belong to the
crown, and the King held such property in a public trust. 29 Cal. 3d at 218, 625 P.2d
at 243, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
3. Section 830 of the California Civil Code reads that "[e]xcept where the
grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent, the owner of the
upland, ... when it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, where there is no
tide,. .. takes to the edge of the lake or stream, at low-water mark ....." CAL.

CMv. CODE § 830 (West 1954). This is meant to be read in conjunction with § 670 of
the Civil Code and § 2077 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 670 provides that
the State is the owner of "all land below the water of a navigable lake or stream
...." CAL. CIV. CODE § 670 (West 1954). Section 2077 sets forth constructional
rules in ambiguous cases, declaring that deeds to lands bordering navigable, nontidal lakes are to be construed as conveying the right of the granter to the low
water mark. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 2077 (West 1955).
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4
if they were inapplicable to circumstances found in California.
The court also relied heavily upon the interpretations of section
830 by the State Land Commission, 5 other state administrative
agencies, and the state legislature, 6 which have all consistently
held that the State claimed ownership to the only low water
7
mark.
The second issue decided by the court concerned the nature of
the public trust imposed upon the land. The nature of a public
trust was described in City of Berkeley v. Superior Court,8 where
the court held that tidelands are owned by the public and that the
State holds these lands in trust for the people for their use for
commerce, navigation, fishing, and other purposes, and that this
trust is retained even though title to the tidelands has been conveyed to private persons, unless the conveyance has promoted
the purposes of the trust.
Lyon asserted that there had never been a doctrine that nontidal, navigable waters were subject to such a trust' Rather, he
asserted that they were subject to a recreational or navigational
easement which allowed the public to use the waters only when
above the low mark. Thus, the bed belonged solely to the riparian
owner, such that when water receded back to the low mark, the
public's right to use the area receded with it.
In response, the State argued that Article XV, section 4 of the

California Constitution 9 provides for freedom of access to, and the
4. The court also noted that the English rule was obviously inappropriate as
the nation expanded westward, where there were great rivers and lakes which
were navigable in fact, even though they were not subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide." 29 Cal. 3d at 218-19, 625 P.2d at 244, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 701. These distinctions, and the inapplicability of the common law to the conditions in much of the
United States, were recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Propeller
Genesee Chief v. Fitgheyn, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1857), and Barney v. Keokuk, 94
U.S. 324 (1876). In 1856, the California Supreme Court held that the tidal character
of a body of water was not a proper test of its navagability. American Water Co. v.
Amodin, 6 Cal. 443 (1856).
5. The files contain hundreds of letters stating or implying that the State's
ownership extends waterward of the low water mark. 29 Cal. 3d at 225, 625 P.2d at
247, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
6. The State conveyed to Lake County its title to Clear Lake, in trust. The
grant assumes that the State takes to the low water mark. Id. at 225, 625 P.2d at
248, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
7. See 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 291 (1964); 30 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 262 (1957); 23
Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 306 (1954); 23 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 97 (1954).
8. 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
9. The California Constitution states that:
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the

right of navigation upon, waters that are navigable, with no distinction made as to whether the waters are tidal or nontidal. The
court, citing Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois,10 held
that the public trust doctrine is equally applicable to nontidal as
well as tidal waters.
A further argument offered by Lyon was that with respect to
the area between the low and high water marks, the public trust
applies only to the water itself, and not to the land underneath.
The court saw no justification for such a proposition, and held
that Lyon's view of the trust was much too narrow and failed to
recognize the public's right to recreational and navigational uses
of California waterways. 1
The final argument offered by Lyon was that his ownership of
the marsh to the low water mark constituted a rule of property,
and that to impress the property with a trust amounted to a compensable taking of private property.1 2 The Court dismissed this
frontage or tidal lands of ... navigable water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required
for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of
such water; and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most
liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall be always attainable for the people thereof.
CAL.CONST. art. XV, § 2.

Numerous cases hold that California owns the land under navigable water in
trust, without distinction as to whether the waters are tidal or nontidal. See
Colberg, Inc. v. California, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967); Boone
v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928); People v. Gold Run D & M Co., 66 Cal.
138, 4 P. 1152 (1884).
10. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Illinois Central involved a grant from the state of 1,000
acres of the bed of Lake Michigan (the entire harbor of the City of Chicago) to the
Illinois Central Railroad. The Supreme Court rejected the premise that the doctrine of a public trust was inapplicable to Lake Michigan simply because there
was no appreciable tide. "The doctrine is founded upon the necessity of preserving to the public the use of navigable waters from private interruption and encroachment, a reason as applicable to navigable fresh waters as to waters moved
by the tide." Id. at 436. Lyon attempted to distinguish Illinois Central on the
ground that Lake Michigan is an enormous body of water essential to the commercial vitality of the Great Lakes region. The California Supreme Court responded
by noting that because no distinctions are made when applying the trust doctrine
between large and small bodies of tidal water, none should be made between large
and small bodies of nontidal water. 29 Cal. 3d at 228, 625 P.2d 249-50, 172 Cal. Rptr.
at 706-07.
11. Lyon asserted that because tidelands are subject to inundation on a daily
basis and nontidal waters are inundated only seasonally, tidelands are constantly
subject to use for commerce, navigation, and fishing, while the land between the
low and high marks of nontidal water is useful during only a limited portion of the
year, thus greatly reducing the necessity for a public trust. 29 Cal. 3d at 240, 625
P.2d at 257, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
12. See Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 438, 326 P.2d 484 (1958). Here,
the court defined a rule of property as:
A settled rule or principle, resting usually on precedents or a course of decisions, regulating the ownership or devolution of property .... The principle appears to be an extension of the "stare decisis" rule, which . ..
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argument, emphasizing that Lyon was not deprived of the use of
the lands between low and high water, and that he may use the
13
area for any purpose not incompatible with the public interest.
Justice Clark filed a strong opinion, in which he both concurred
and dissented with the court's holding. He noted that, in this
case, there was an important distinction to be made between tidal
and nontidal waters since much of California's rich farmland is
reclaimed marshland, and that the benefits derived from the establishment of the trust were strongly outweighed by the removal
4
of these areas from agricultural productivity.'
2. Designation of Property Lines of Property Adjoining
Navigable Non-Tidal Waters:
California v. Superior Court of Placer County
In Californiav. Superior Court of Placer County,' the California
seems to apply with peculiar force and strictness to decisions which have
determined questions respecting real property and vested rights ....
Id. at 456, 326 P.2d at 494.
13. 29 Cal. 3d at 232, 625 P.2d at 252, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
14. The court stated that:
Application of the trust doctrine to the shorezone is contrary to Califoruse of the
nia public policy. Rather than precluding farming ...
shorezone, the policy has been to encourage reclamation and farming...
of these properties.
Protection of parts of our historic shorezone for the purposes permitted
by the trust is a worthy endeavor but it should not be accomplished with a
blunderbuss that confiscates thousands-perhaps millions--of titles, and
jeopardizes existing use of... farm lands.
Id. at 238, 625 P.2d at 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
1. 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1981). Shoreline owners of
Lake Tahoe filed an action for declaratory relief and inverse condemnation and
claimed violation of their civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), when the
State Lands Commission proposed to record claims of ownership of property between high and low water in navigable nontidal lakes and rivers throughout the
State. The plaintiffs' alleged ownership of the lands and claimed that the State
wrongfully asserted a public trust. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for
partial summary judgment, ruling that "no portion of the property involved in this
action landward of the last natural low water mark of Lake Tahoe is or ever was
sovereign property of the State or subject to the common law public trust for commerce, navigation and fishing.. . ." Id. at 243-244, 625 P.2d at 258, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
715. The trial court denied the People's motions for partial summary judgment
whereupon the People sought a preemptory writ of mandate to direct the trial
court to vacate its order and grant the People's order. Id.
The issues in this case are the same as those in State of California v. Superior
Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981), with the additional two issues discussed above. In Lyon, a landowner ified an action against

Supreme Court held that the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied against the government if the result would nullify a strong
public policy adopted for the benefit of the public. 2 The court further held that the appropriate standard by which to measure the
boundary between public and private ownership of a body of
water 3 is the current level of the lake, not the last natural low
4
water mark of the lake, as held by the trial court.
In addressing the estoppel issue, the court noted the four ele5
ments necessary to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel. If
the state was barred from asserting a public trust in the lands, the
result would be to nullify a strong rule of policy adopted for the
benefit of the public. 6 In support, the court reasoned that the
shorezone is a fragile and complex resource providing the environment with various species of plants and wildlife. Numerous
studies and reports document the adverse effects of reclamation
and development of these areas. 7 The need for protection of the
the state seeking to quiet title to marshland along the shore of a navigable lake.
The trial court held in favor of the landowner. The Supreme Court of California
rejected the landowner's contention that he held title to the high water mark, but
held that he had title to the low water mark. The court further held that nontidal
waters were subject to the public trust. Thus the landowner's title to such lands
was impressed with the public trust and he could use such land in any that was
not incompatible with the public's interest.
2. See, e.g., City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 493, 476 P.2d 423, 91
Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970); County of San Diego v. Cal. Water etc. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 817, 829830, 186 P.2d 124 (1947).
3. Lake Tahoe is the body of water in question in the present case.
4. The last natural water mark was prior to the construction of a dam in 1870.
5. As Justice Sullivan stated in City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462,
476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970), there are four elements necessary to apply the
doctrine:
(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must
intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party
asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the
other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must
rely upon the conduct to his injury.
Id. at 489, 476 P.2d at 442, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
6. Under the public trust, land is owned by the state "in trust for the public,
for their use for commerce, navigation, fishing, recreation or for the purpose of
preserving the property in its natural state." State of California v. Superior Court
(Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d at 226, 625 P.2d at 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1981). The public trust
applies to the land in question. 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 288, 294 (1964). The fact a
private landowner has title to tidewaters does not establish that the ownership is
free of the public interest. See, e.g., People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138
P. 79 (1913).
7. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service (1973), General Plan for
Management of Nat. Forest Lands, Lake Tahoe Basin, Review Draft, Lake Tahoe
Management Unit, South Lake Tahoe 1, 2; California Dept. Fish and Game, Fish
and Wildlife Res. of Anderson Marsh, Clear Lake, Lake County (1974); California
Dept. Fish and Game, 1 Fish and Wildlife Plan 14 (1966).
Justice McComb regarding the public use of tidelands:
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands trust-
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shorezone was recognized by the legislature in its enactment of
various statutes designed to protect the region.8 The court did not
agree with the plaintiffs' assertions that the public interest in preserving the lake would be enhanced by private rather than public
ownership and that there are regulations limiting the owner's use
which are adequate to protect the public's interest.9 The court
noted that since four thousand miles of California lakes and
streams will be affected, the shorezone of Lake Tahoe is not the
only concern. Thus, preservation of the public trust allows state
flexibility in determining the appropriate use of the land. Police
power has not proved to be an effective means of protection thus
far. The court concluded that the state may not be estopped from
asserting the rights of the public in those lands.10
In addressing the issue of the boundary between public and private ownership," the court agreed with the state that the measuring of the boundary line between public and private ownership
which existed prior to the dam's construction, as asserted under
the plaintiffs' proposed standard, would create an evidentiary
problem. In addition, the dam has been in existence since 1870
is a preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may
serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and
which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.
8. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 5093.50, 5811 (West Supp. 1981).
§ 5093.50 provides that:
It is the policy of the State of California that certain rivers which possess
extraordinary scenic, recreational, fishery or wildlife values, shall be preserved in their free-flowing state, together with their immediate environments, for the benefit and enjoyment of the people of the state. The
Legislature declares that such use of these rivers is the highest and most
beneficial use and is a reasonable and beneficial use of water within the
meaning of Section 3 of Article XrV of the State Constitution. It is the
purpose of this chapter to create a California Wild and Scenic Rivers System to be administered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
§5811 provides that:
the remaining wetlands of this state are of increasingly critical economic,
aesthetic, and scientific value to the people of California, and.. . there is
need for an affirmative and sustained public policy and program directed
at their preservation, restoration, and enhancement, in order that such
wetlands shall continue in perpetuity to meet the needs of the people.
9. Plaintiffs' contend that the problems at Lake Tahoe are related to a large
influx of people. This influx contributes to pollution and overuse of the beach and
forest areas. The owners further contend that the best preserved areas are privately owned.
10. 29 Cal. 3d at 247, 625 P.2d at 260, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 717 (1981).
11. The issue of whether the 1870 water mark or the current water level is the
appropriate standard; the court has no direct authority to rely on. 29 Cal. 3d at 247,
625 P.2d at 260, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 717 (1981).

and as such, the period required for acquisition of property by
prescriptive rights has passed.12 Other jurisdictions have held
that a landowner loses ownership of property covered by water
resulting from construction of a dam if the period for prescriptive
rights of acquisition has passed. 13 The artificial condition is
deemed to pass from private ownership to the same trust as lands
covered by navigable lakes. The maintenance of the artificial con14
dition is enforceable by the state as well as the private owners.
The appropriate standard by-which to measure the boundary between public and private ownership is the current level of the
lake.
The plaintiffs, per the ruling, are permitted to use the shorezone
for purposes which are compatible with the public trust. Landowners may continue to use previously built structures in the
shorezone as long as the use is not inconsistent with the reasonable needs of the trust. If inconsistent, the plaintiffs' will be compensated for the improvements they constructed.15
The minority believes that the public trust applies only to tide
and submerged lands, not to shorezones.16 In City of Long Beach
v. Mansell,17 it was established that in appropriate circumstances,
the people could be estopped from asserting a trust when the resulting injustice would outweigh public policy. The homeowners
and farmers would suffer "great injustice" which outweighs the
public trust.
STEPHEN H. DOORLAG

12. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1007 (West Supp. 1981); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 325 (West
1954).
13. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 132 Ark. 316, 200 S.W. 1014, 1016 (1918), State v.
Sorenson, 222 Iowa 1248, 271 N.W. 234, 238-39 (1937).
14. State v. Sorenson, 222 Iowa 1248, 271 N.W. 234 (1937); Chowchilla Farms
Inc. v. Martin, 219 Cal. 1, 18, 25 P.2d 435 (1933).
15. CA. PuB. RES. CODE § 6312 (West 1977); Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892), City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 534, 606
P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
16. See, e.g., Clark concurring and dissenting opinion, State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon). 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981).
17. City of Long Beach v. Manseil, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23

(1970).

